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IV. CONSTITrTONALuZATION AND SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION
A. Introduction
The protection against compulsory self-incrimination originated in England
and colonial America as a common law rule. It remained a common law rule in
England, and is a common law rule today.533 In colonial America, the
protection also received some statutory recognition,534 and, after the
revolution, provisions prohibiting compulsory self-incrimination appeared in
the federal bill of rights and in the constitutions of most of the states.535 Today,
we invariably think of the protection in constitutional, rather than common law,
terms.
The rule barring the admissibility of involuntary confessions also
originated in England and America as a common law rule. It remained a
common law rule in England until it was codified in 1984.536 In the United
States, it was generally dealt with as a common law rule until 1936. 537 In that
53 See PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE ch. 15-36 (13th ed. 1982). Some aspects of the
privilege have been codified in England. See, e.g., Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 Vict.,
ch. 36, § 1(a) (Eng.) (accused shall not be called as a witness except upon his own
application).534 See LEVY, supra note 13, at 344-45 (Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641
contained an equivocal protection against compelling confessions by torture), 354-55
(Connecticut statute of 1673 contained unequivocal protection against torture), 358 (Virginia
statute of 1677 recognized protection against compulsory self-incrimination for witnesses).
535 See LEVY, supra note 13, at 405-32.
536 Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984, § 76 (Eng.).
537 That the involuntary confession rule was generally perceived as a common law rule
appears from its treatment in evidence treatises such as 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE
§§ 213-235 (Boston, Little, Brown 6th ed. 1852); 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE
§§ 219-35 (Wigmore rev.) (Boston, Little, Brown 16th ed. 1899); 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 815-67 (2d ed. 1923). See also 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 417, at § 146.
In Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the Court held that exclusion of an
involuntary confession was dictated by the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination provision.
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year, the United States Supreme Court decided Brown v. Mississippi,'538 a case
of confession by governmental torture. In Brown, the Court for the first time
held an involuntary confession inadmissible in a state criminal case. Since the
Court lacks authority to prescribe common law rules of evidence for state
proceedings, and there was no applicable federal statute, it had to base
inadmissibility on the Constitution. Its menu of constitutional choices,
however, did not include the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination,
which was not then applicable to state criminal proceedings. 539 Rather, the only
relevant constitutional provision was the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court used what was available, and the confession rule
became constitutionalized. Between 1936 and 1964, the Court gave the
confession rule its greatest development and direction by deciding more than
thirty state cases involving claims of involuntariness. 540 It resolved all of them
under the Due Process Clause. As a result, we invariably think of the
confession rule today as a federal due process doctrine.541
In 1964, in Malloy v. Hogan,542 the Court partially overruled Twining v.
New Jersey543 and Adamson v. California544 and held that the privilege was
applicable to state proceedings. In an effort to demonstrate that its decision was
not radical and that Twining and Adamson had already been undercut, the
Court said, "Decisions of the Court since Twining and Adamson have departed
from the . . . view expressed in those cases. We discuss first the decisions
which forbid the use of coerced confessions in state criminal prosecutions." 545
In an article published in the same year, I said that the Court had performed a
"shotgun wedding of the privilege to the confessions rule." 546 I made that
characterization with scant consideration of the history, operations, and
objectives of both the common law and the constitutional protections. I now
want to revisit the subject with greater care.
As we have already seen, the distance between the common law privilege
and the common law confession rule is not as great as some have claimed.
What can be said of the two constitutional protections? In answering this
This constitutional theory was ignored in subsequent cases prior to the mid-1960s. See
Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 OHIo
ST. L.J 449, 453 n.19 (1964).
538 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
539 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78 (1908). The cases are discussed in Herman, supra note 537, at 462-66.
540 See Comment, The Coerced Confession Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U.
CR1. L. REv. 313 n.1 (1964).
541 See 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 417, at § 146.
542 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
543 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
544 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
545 378 U.S. at 6.
546 Herman, supra note 537, at 465.
1992]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
question, we should follow our previous mode of analysis by inquiring into the
history, operations, and objectives of both constitutional doctrines. Only such
an analysis will enable us to determine the existence and extent of differences
between the constitutional doctrines.
B. History of the Constitutional Protections
The history of the constitutional protections has, in large part, already been
described. Each constitutional protection came from a common law analogue.
The common law protections had a significant overlap, yet in a few respects
were distinct. The constitutional right against compelled incrimination was
adopted in 1791, as was the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not adopted until 1868.
As our earlier survey established, both federal and state courts relied
primarily on the common law confession rule in deciding whether confessions
were admissible. Neither the constitutional protection against compulsory self-
incrimination nor any other constitutional provision played a prominent part
through 1850. In 1897, the Supreme Court held in Bran v. United States547
that the admissibility of confessions in federal criminal proceedings was to be
determined by applying the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination provision.
Brain had little impact, however, 548 and, as late as 1951, it was not clear
whether the exclusion of involuntary confessions in federal cases was based on
the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination provision, the Fifth Amendment's
due process provision, or the common law confession rule.549 By contrast, as
already noted, beginning in 1936, the Supreme Court used the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process provision in state proceedings, the Fifth
Amendment's self-incrimination provision being inapplicable until 1964. Since
1966, the Fifth Amendment's privilege, as construed and applied in Miranda,
has occupied center stage in both state and federal proceedings as long as the
case involves custodial interrogation by the police-the triggering elements of
Miranda. If it does, Miranda's advice/waiver test comes into play. If it does
not, Miranda is inapplicable. In the latter event, one might think that courts
would ask whether the suspect had been compelled to speak in violation of the
Fifth Amendment privilege, but courts seldom do. Instead, they ordinarily
resolve the admissibility issue by invoking the due process nde and asking
whether the confession was involuntary. 550
547 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
548 See Herman, supra note 537, at 453 n.19. For a thorough discussion of Bran and
post-Brain cases, see Stephen A. Saltzburg, Miranda v. Arizona Revisited: Constitutional
Law or Judicial Fiat, 26 WASHBURN L.J 1, 4-12 (1986).
549 See United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 41 (1951).
550 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S.
104, 110 (1985). In Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967) (per curiam), the crucial
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The history of the constitutional protections suggests similarity. Both
constitutional protections derive from significantly overlapping common law
doctrines. Moreover, an aversion to torture is a part of the backdrop of both
protections. The constitutional privilege was preceded by statutes that
prohibited obtaining confessions by torture.5 51 The due process protection was
announced in a case of confession by torture,55 2 and the Court has noted that
the very idea of due process of law expresses an aversion to "illegal
confinement, torture and extortion of confessions."5 53 Although history
suggests similarity, history cannot be determinative, for history alone cannot
tell us how similar the constitutional protections are. In order to answer that
question, we must know how the protections operate and what their objectives
are.
C. Operations of the Constitutional Protections554
1. Introduction
In our earlier examination and comparison of the operations of the common
law protections, we found many similarities and a few differences. Some of the
asserted differences were illusory, and others were slight and did not support
the conclusion that the protections were wholly distinct. The significant
difference involved confessions that had been induced by (1) threats and
promises made by private persons or (2) promises made and kept by
events occurred after Malloy but before Miranda. Miranda's advice/waiver formula was
therefore inapplicable, see Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) (Miranda applies
only to trials beginning after the date on which Miranda was decided), but the Fifth
Amendment's stricture against compelled self-incrimination could have been used. Although
four justices believed that the use of the confession violated the Fifth Amendment, the Court
held the confession inadmissible under the due process rule. Whether courts should prefer
the due process rule to the Fifth Amendment's privilege is addressed infra at notes 641-66
and accompanying text.
551 See supra note 534 and accompanying text.
552 See supra note 538 and accompanying text.
553 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236 (1940). See also Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (expressing an aversion to "Star Chamber" tactics).
554 In dealing with operational aspects, I shall not consider the fact that the failure to
give advice or obtain a waiver is fatal under Miranda's interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment in cases of police custodial interrogation, but is merely a relevant datum under
the due process approach. That difference, although substantial, is unimportant for present
purposes. Lurking barely off-stage in this Article is the controversial question of whether
Miranda's advice/waiver requirements make sense as an interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment. That being so, it seems foolish to accept the requirements at face value in this
Article. For my purposes, it makes more sense to compare the operation of the due process
rule with the operation of Brain's version of the Fifth Amendment.
19921
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
governmental agents. Here there was no strong argument that the privilege had
been violated, so inadmissibility had to be based on an independent concern for
reliability. All other involuntary confessions, however, could be excluded
under the privilege, and a broader confession rule therefore served no purpose.
Since the common law protections gave rise to today's constitutional
protections, it would not be surprising if the same key differences continued. 555
2. Operation of the Constitutional Privilege
The Supreme Court has the ultimate authority to shape the operation of the
constitutional protections. The Court's decisions establish a number of points
regarding the operation of the privilege.
(a) The privilege protects only against official action.556 Private action, no
matter how coercive it might be, is not prohibited by the privilege, and
confessions obtained by private compulsion are not inadmissible under the
privilege, absent collusion between governmental and private actors.
(b) Not all governmental action relating to a confession is prohibited by the
privilege. The privilege prohibits only governmental "coercion" or
"overreaching." 557
(c) The operation of the privilege is multi-faceted. If a claim of privilege is
honored by the questioner, the witness will be permitted to remain silent.558 If
the questioner rejects the claim of privilege and seeks to have a sanction
imposed on the witness, the privilege may be used to avoid the sanction.559
The privilege has its own exclusionary rule. If the witness has been compelled
to answer in violation of the privilege, the answer will be inadmissible in a
555 In the following discussion, I do not intend to reconsider most of the asserted
differences that proved to be illusory or insubstantial in the common law context. These
differences are illusory or insubstantial in the constitutional context as well.
556 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986). This aspect of Connelly was
neither novel nor controversial. None of the provisions of the Bill of Rights is triggered by
wholly private action. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTIrUTIONAL LAW § 18-
3 (2d ed. 1988). The same was true of the common law privilege. See supra notes 463-64
and accompanying text.
557 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986). See also Hoffa v. United States,
385 U.S. 293,304 (1966) ("[A] necessary element of compulsory self-incrimination is some
kind of compulsion.").
558 See, e.g., Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (police desisted from interrogating
suspect who asserted the privilege after receiving Miranda warnings; suspect's silence not
admissible to impeach his trial testimony that he had been "framed").
559 See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977) (loss of unpaid position
in political party); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973) (loss of government contracts);
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (disbarment).
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subsequent criminal proceeding. 560 Although the privilege is multi-faceted, the
various uses of the privilege do not occur with equal frequency. The first two
uses dominate. As a result, witnesses are seldom compelled to answer over
their legitimate claim of privilege, and there is seldom occasion to bar the
admissibility of a compelled answer.
(d) If a witness legitimately asserts the privilege, the government's only
alternatives are either to honor the privilege or to offer immunity in exchange
for information. 561 An offer of use and derivative-use immunity will trump the
privilege.562 If the witness persists in refusing to answer, sanctions may be
imposed on the witness.
(e) In determining whether a witness has been "compelled" to speak in
violation of the privilege, the Court has not used a "totality of the
circumstances" approach. It has not considered the personal characterics of the
witness, the environment in which the questioning occurs, or the manner in
which the questioning takes place. Rather, in an ill-defined way, it has made an
abstract assessment of the power or force of the sanction imposed on silence. If
the power or force reaches a certain level, also ill-defined, compulsion exists,
and the witness will be protected under the privilege.563 For example, in
Garrity v. New Jersey,564 police officers gave unimmunized, incriminating
answers at an inquiry into ticket-fixing after being told that they would be fired
if they claimed the privilege. The Court held that the threat constituted
compulsion in violation of the privilege. It never even mentioned the facts,
which Justice Harlan noted in his dissent, that all of the officers were advised
that they had a right to remain silent, three of the officers were represented by
counsel, a fourth officer had decided that counsel was not necessary, the
interrogation took place in familiar surroundings, and the interrogation was
both brief and civilized. 565
(f) Related to the point made in paragraph (e) is another: in administering
the various functions of the privilege, the Court ordinarily does not balance the
government's interest in obtaining information against the individual's interest
in avoiding compulsion. Whether a case involves the admissibility of a
compelled statement in a criminal proceeding or a witness's effort to avoid a
sanction for nondisclosure, the Court normally ignores the government's
interest in obtaining information. For example, in Garrity,566 the officers'
560 See Baltimore City Dep't of Social Services v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 562
(1990) (citing many cases).
561 See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 79, 84 (1973).
562 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
563 The analytical process used by the Court is described in greater detail and
thoughtfully criticized in MARK L. BERGER, TAKING THE FIFrH 201-09 (1980).
564 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
565 385 U.S. at 502-06 (Harlan, I., dissenting).
566 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
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unimmunized, incriminating answers were held inadmissible in a subsequent
criminal proceeding notwithstanding the state's undeniably strong interest in
rooting out official corruption. A similar result was reached in New Jersey v.
Portash,567 in which a municipal official was compelled by threat of contempt
to make immunized statements at a grand jury proceeding. The Court held that
the compelled statements could not be used to impeach Portash's testimony at a
subsequent prosecution for misconduct in office. Although the State argued that
it had a strong interest in deterring perjury, the Court held that the threat of
contempt was quintessential compulsion and that "[balancing] is
impermissible. 5 68
The Court has used the same approach in relieving persons of the
obligation to incriminate themselves and of disabilities imposed for failure to
divulge incriminating information. For example, in Gardner v. Broderick,5 69
the Court held that it was unconstitutional to fire a police officer for refusing to
give unimmunized, incriminating information at an official inquiry into police
corruption. The Court explicitly refused to weigh the state's interest in
protecting the public from dishonest employees. Nine years later, in Leowift
v. Cunningham,570 the Court held that it was unconstitutional to oust a political
party official from office and to bar him from holding office for refusal to give
unimmunized, incriminating information at a grand jury inquiry into his
conduct in office. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger refused to weigh
the interest in fostering "public confidence in the integrity of [the state's]
political process." 571 The Court has followed the same course in many other
cases.
572
There is a simple explanation for the Court's unwillingness to balance the
government's interest in obtaining information against the individual's interest
567 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
568 Id. at 459. Once the trial judge ruled that the statements were admissible to
impeach, Portash decided not to testify in his own behalf. Hence, Portash's statements were
not directly used against him. The Court analyzed the case, however, as though the
statements had been used.
569 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
570 431 U.S. 801 (1977).
571 Id. at 808.
572 In none of the following cases did the Court weigh the governmental interest in
obtaining information: Leflcowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973) (forfeiture of present and
future government contracts); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (transfer tax on
marijuana); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280
(1968) (loss of public employment); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968)
(requirement of registration of guns commonly used by criminals); Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (requirement that gamblers register with government agency);
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (disbarment); Albertson v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965) (requirement that Communists register with government
agency).
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in avoiding compulsion: the Court believes that the tension between
governmental and individual interests can best be adjusted by use of immunity.
If immunity is granted, the state can then obtain the information and use it to
the witness's disadvantage in proceedings to impose civil sanctions. This
partially vindicates the governmental interest while protecting the accused in
criminal proceedings.573
On infrequent occasion the Court's holdings have diverged from those
discussed above. In Shapiro v. United States,574 the Court held that it was
constitutional to use in a criminal proceeding information contained in business
records that the defendant had been required to keep and disclose to the
government. The requirement had been imposed as part of a governmental
effort to control prices during wartime, and the Court was influenced by the
government's strong interest in both controlling prices and punishing
violations. 575 Twenty-three years later, in California v. Byers, 576 the Court
upheld a conviction for violating a statute that required accident-involved
drivers to stop and identify themselves. The principal purpose of the "stop and
identify" requirement was to facilitate the financial responsibility of drivers,
rather than to impose criminal liability, 577 and the Court took explicit note of
that fact. 578 Most recently, in Baltimore City Department of Social Services v.
573 For cases in which the Court has suggested that the government must grant
immunity to obtain compulsory disclosure, see Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 79
(1973); Haynes v. United States, 370 U.S. 85, 98 (1968). See also Albertson v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965) (statutory immunity held unconstitutionally
narrow).
574 335 U.S. 1 (1948). The case is discussed at length in BERGER, supra note 85, at
183-85.
575 See 335 U.S. at 32-33; see also John H. Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict
between the Privilege Against Self Incrimination and the Government's Need for
Information, 1966 SuP. Cr. REV. 103, 132 ("ITihe war power... may have had some
influence on the Shapiro decision. . .
576 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
577 See itL at 430.
578 Byers was a 4-1-4 decision with Justice Harlan casting the crucial vote. Chief
Justice Burger's plurality opinion states,
Tension between the State's demand for disclosures and the protection of the right
against self-incrimination is likely to give rise to serious questions. Inevitably these must
be resolved by balancing the public need on the one hand, and the individual claim to
constitutional protections on the other, neither interest can be treated lightly.
402 U.S. at 427. The plurality then held that the compelled identification was neither
sufficiently incriminating, id. at 431, nor testimonial, id. at 431-34, and that the privilege
was therefore inapplicable. Justice Harlan, who disagreed with the plurality on both points,
id. at 435-36, also engaged in balancing, id. at 449, and concluded that the state's interest
19921
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Bouknight,579 the Court refused to permit the invocation of the privilege by a
mother who was ordered to produce her child in court on threat of
incarceration for contempt. Even though the Court recognized that the act of
production might be incriminating,580 it held that compulsory production was
authorized by a combination of two factors. They were that the mother had
been given only conditional custody of the child581 and that production was
sought as part of a regulatory, non-criminal program which sought to protect
the best interests of the child.582
A common thread runs through the Fifth Amendment cases in which the
Court has engaged in balancing. In Shapiro, Byers and Bouknight, the Court
believed that the governmental interest was essentially non-criminal and should
not be frustrated by a constitutional protection that was intended to operate in
criminal proceedings. 583 By contrast, when the government interest is
essentially criminal, the Court does not engage in balancing. 584 Indeed, even as
to essentially non-criminal, regulatory schemes which have a criminal
enforcement side, it is not clear that compelled information may be used in
criminal enforcement proceedings. Although the information was held
admissible in Shapiro, and Justice Harlan's concurrence in Byers suggests
admissibility, 585 Bouknight even more strongly suggests that compelled
information is inadmissible.586 Consequently, there is reason to believe that the
in deterring careless driving and insuring financial responsibility outweighed the driver's
interest in avoiding compulsory incrimination. Id. at 450-57.
579 493 U.S. 549 (1990).5 80 See id. at 555.
581 See id. at 559-60.
5 82 See id. at 555-61.
583 See Baltimore City Dep't of Social Svcs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 555-61
(1990); California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427-31 (1971); Shapiro v. United States, 335
U.S. 1, 17 (1948).
584 See New jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979), discussed supra note 567 and
accompanying text. See also the concurring opinion in Byers in which Justice Harlan said:
mhe primary context from which the privilege emerges is that of the criminal
process, in both the investigatory and trial phases. When applied in that context, the
sole governmental interest that the privilege defeats is the enforcement of law through
criminal sanctions. And, with regard to the witness' privilege, the judge can, for the
most part, draw the line between "real" and "imaginary" risks of incrimination in
marginal cases, thereby offsetting the tendency for the privilege to become an absolute
right not to disclose any information at all.
402 U.S. at 440.
585 See 402 U.S. at 443,447-48, 451.
586
We are not called upon to define the precise limitations that may exist upon the
State's ability to use the testimonial aspects of Bouknight's act of production in
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Court may be willing to use immunity even in the regulatory area as the
preferred device for resolving the tension between governmental and individual
interests.
(g) The final operational point that merits our present attention is that the
constitutional protection against compulsory self-incrimination guards against
compelled admissions as well as full confessions. 587
3. Operation of the Due Process Rule
Just as the Supreme Court has shaped the operation of the constitutional
privilege, so it has shaped the operation of the due process rule barring
involuntary confessions.
(a) In common with the privilege, the due process rule protects only against
official action. The common law confession rule barred putatively unreliable
confessions obtained by persons "in authority." 588 Governmental actors
(magistrates or constables, for example) were always "in authority," but the
term was not limited to them. It also included private persons who were
concerned in the apprehension and prosecution of the suspect. For example, the
victim was a person in authority. So were the suspect's employer and members
of the employer's family.589 Under the due process rule, some lower courts
subsequent criminal proceedings. But we note that imposition of such limitations is not
foreclosed. The same custodial role that limited the ability to resist the production order
may give rise to corresponding limitations upon the direct and indirect use of that
testimony. The State's regulatory requirement in the usual case may neither compel
incriminating testimony nor aid in a criminal prosecution, but the Fifth Amendment
protections are not thereby necessarily unavailable to the person who complies with the
regulatory requirement after invoking the privilege and subsequently faces prosecution.
In a broad range of contexts, the Fifth Amendment limits prosecutors' ability to use
testimony that has been compelled.
493 U.S. at 561-62 (citations and parenthetical quotations and summaries omitted). Among
the cited cases are New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979); Leary v. United States,
395 U.S. 6 (1969); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968); Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 495 (1967).
587 This is one of the less controversial statements in Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 476-77
(1966).
588 HENRY H. Joy, ADnMISSIBILIY OF CONFESSIONS *5, 13 (Philadelphia, John S.
Little 11843).
589 Id. at *5-33, 13-28. See also George E. Dix, Federal Constitutional Confession
Law: The 1986 and 1987 Supreme Court Ters, 67 TEX. L. REV. 231, 302 n.372 (1988).
Professor Dix sensibly prefers to read the common law cases as supporting two somewhat
different rules: (1) a confession is inadmissible if induced by a promise made by a person in
authority; and (2) a confession is inadmissible if induced by a threat made by anyone. Id. at
302.
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followed the common law by holding that a confession is inadmissible if
obtained by private violence.5 90 Thus, as noted earlier, there was an
operational difference between the confession rule and the privilege. The
Supreme Court's decision in Colorado v. Connelly,59' however, requires
official action to trigger the due process rule as well as the privilege. Connelly
walked up to a police officer and admitted committing murder. Shortly
afterwards, a detective arrived and asked Connelly "what he had on his
mind." 592 Connelly gave some of the details of an unsolved murder and
eventually led officers to the scene of the crime. At the time he confessed,
Connelly was a schizophrenic who suffered from a "command auditory
hallucination": he heard the voice of God ordering him to confess or kill
himself. The Supreme Court held that the due process rule required "police
conduct causally related to the confession." 593 In a dictum, the Court stated
that private acts of violence would not make a confession inadmissible.594 By
limiting the due process rule to official conduct that is causally related to the
confession, Connelly has obliterated an important common law distinction and
made the due process rule more like the constitutional privilege.
(b) Not all governmental conduct will suffice to make a confession
inadmissible under the due process rule. In Connelly, the Court variously
described the required conduct as "coercive government misconduct," 595
"police overreaching," 596 and "coercive police conduct." 597 The Court did not
define these terms, but it is clear that the Court's concept of governmental
coercion or overreaching does not include either a detective's prompting of a
statement or the prosecution's use of a statement in evidence against the
maker.598
(c) In common with the constitutional privilege, the operation of the due
process rule is multifaceted, but not in the same way or to the same extent.
Unlike the privilege, the due process rule functions primarily to exclude
confessions. Although it also facilitates silence, it does so only in cases in
which an interrogator, aware of the content of the due process rule, chooses to
follow it and not press for an answer. The due process rule is ordinarily of no
help to a suspect whose refusal to answer is "punished" by a continuation of
590 See 3 WIGMORE, supra note 80, at § 833.
591 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
5 9 2 Id. at 160.
593 Id. at 164.
594 "The most outrageous behavior by a private party seeking to secure evidence
against a defendant does not make that evidence inadmissible under the Due Process
Clause." Id. at 166. Whether this dictum will stand the test of time remains to be seen.
595 Id. at 163.
596 Id. at 163, 164.
59 7 Id. at 164.
598 Id. at 165 (use of confession does not suffice).
[Vol. 53:497
SELF-INCRIMINATION AND DUE PROCESS
custody or other abuse. If the suspect does not have a lawyer who is aware of
what is happening and seeks habeas corpus relief, there is nothing the suspect
can do. The same would be true, however, if the privilege were asserted,
rejected and "punished" in a secret proceeding.
(d) Unlike the privilege, the due process protection does not offer
immunity as the device for resolving the tension between the government's
interest in obtaining information and the individual's interest in avoiding
compulsory self-incrimination. If a suspect refuses to answer questions, the
interrogator will either press for an answer or desist, but will not confer
immunity.599 There is nothing intrinsic to the due process rule, however, that
would prohibit the interrogator from seeking immunity. Thus, immunity does
not present an intrinsic operational difference between the due process rule and
the privilege. It does, however, raise a practical problem: under typical
immunity statutes, police officers have not been given the authority to grant or
seek immunity.600 Nor do they want the authority. Rather, they want to get
statements that can be used at trial against the maker, and immunity would
disserve this purpose.
(e) Unlike the privilege, the due process protection requires a court to
consider the "totality of circumstances" in determining whether a confession is
involuntary. This comprehends the personal characteristics of the suspect and
the environment and techniques of interrogation. 601 At the same time, in more
than a few cases, the Supreme Court has stressed single, coercive factors in
holding that a confession was involuntary. 602 These cases tend to blunt any
distinction between the due process protection and the privilege.
(f) Unlike the privilege, the due process rule frankly acknowledges
balancing as a norm:
599 Lest I be misunderstood, I want to repeat that I am not concerned with Miranda at
the present time. Under Miranda and its progeny, if a suspect asserts his right to remain
silent, the interrogator must scrupulously honor the assertion. This requires immediate
disengagement, but does not prohibit a resumption of questioning after a period of time.
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). If the suspect asserts his right to counsel, the
interrogator must disengage and may not reengage until the suspect opens the door.
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). It does not take a lot to open the door. See
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983) (when the suspect asked what was going to
happen to him, he opened the door to a resumption of questioning) (plurality opinion).
600 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6003 (1988); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.44
(Anderson 1987); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 50.20,50.30 (McKinney 1992).
601 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (dictum); Lawrence
Herman, The Suprene Cowt, the Attorney General, and the Good Old Days of Police
Interrogation, 48 OHio ST. L.. 733,745 (1987).
602 See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (36 consecutive hours of
relay interrogation); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (brutal physical force).
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"[loluntariness" has reflected an accommodation of the complex of
values implicated in police questioning of a suspect. At one end of the
spectrum is the acknowledged need for police questioning as a tool for the
effective enforcement of criminal laws... At the other end of the spectrum is
the set of values reflecting society's deeply felt belief that the criminal law
cannot be used as an instrument of unfairness, and that the possibility of unfair
and even brutal police tactics poses a real and serious threat to civilized notions
of justice.
This Court's decisions reflect a frank recognition that the Constitution
requires the sacrifice of neither security nor liberty.6 03
Insofar as the privilege is concerned, balancing is not the norm in any context
and is particularly inappropriate in the context of ordinary criminal law
enforcement divorced from essentially civil regulatory schemes. 604 Insofar as
the due process rule is concerned, however, balancing is the norm in
determining whether a confession is involuntary enough to be excluded from
evidence in any criminal case.605 This is a significant difference between the
two constitutional protections. 60 6
(g) In common with the privilege, the due process rule applies to
admissions as well as confessions. 607
4. Operations Compared
When we compare the operations of the constitutional privilege and the due
process confession rule, we find numerous similarities. Both deal with
confessions and admissions. Both are triggered by official action only; both are
concerned'only with "coercion" or "overreaching;" and both facilitate silence
and have an exclusionary effect, although, as was also the case with their
common law analogues, their primary and secondary roles are reversed. The
603 Schneddoth, 412 U.S. at 224-25 (dictum).
604 See upra notes 566-86 and accompanying text.
605 In Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), the Court held a confession
admissible as voluntary even though the police denied the suspect's repeated requests to see
counsel. The Court's rationale, which obviously involved balancing, was that requiring the
police to honor a request for counsel would have a "devastating effect" on police
interrogation. Id. at 441. The case is discussed in Yale Kamisar, Remembering the "Old
World" of riminal Procedure: A Reply to Professor Grano, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 537,
569-71 (1990) [hereinafter Kamisar, Reply].
606 Insofar as the privilege is concerned, balancing is a phenomenon associated with
the emergence of the regulatory state. See BERGER, supra note 85, at 182-92. Since the
regulatory state emerged after the constitutionalization of the privilege, one does not find
balancing being used in connection with the common law privilege. Consequently, I omitted
any reference to balancing in discussing and comparing the common law protections.
607 3 WIGMORE, supra note 80, § 821, at 322-28.
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most substantial difference lies in balancing. A less substantial difference is that
due process analysis sometimes requires a consideration of the "totality of the
circumstances." Thus, as they have been construed and applied by the Supreme
Court, both protections operate in similar fashion. Indeed, given the changes
wrought by Connelly, the two constitutional protections are more alike than
were their common law counterparts.
D. Objectives of the Constitutional Protections
1. Introduction
In our earlier examination and comparison of the objectives of the common
law protections, we found important similarities. The common law privilege
was intended to reflect the values inherent in individual sovereignty. These
values are autonomy, dignity, and privacy. Underlying them are separate
interests in bodily integrity and mental integrity (repose, peace of mind, and
control of information about one's self). In addition, we attributed to the
common law privilege a concern (secondary rather than primary) that
confessions be reliable. The same concern for reliability (primary, however,
rather than secondary) underlay the common law confession rule. Apart from
reliability, however, the confession rule was not concerned with the calculus of
individual sovereignty. That a confession was induced by a broken promise did
not make it inadmissible, according to Warickshall. Rather, the only test was
whether the promise might induce an innocent person to confess falsely.
Since the common law protections gave rise to today's constitutional
protections, it would not be surprising if all or some of the common law values
and interests informed the constitutional protections.
2. Objectives of the Constitutional Privilege608
The drafting history of the Fifth Amendment is unrevealing, 609 so we
cannot turn to it as a source of information. Rather, our search for the
objectives of the constitutional privilege must focus on the decisions of the
Supreme Court and the commentary they have generated.
608 1 feel constrained to repeat the statement I made before I compared the objectives
of the common law protections. See supra note 428. I am seeking only to identify the
objectives commonly attributed to the constitutional privilege or those that may be fairly
inferred. My only purpose is to compare the objectives with the objectives of the due
process confession rule. I am not seeking justifications for either constitutional protection.
Thus, I am not concerned that some objective may not suffice to explain all of the uses to
which a particular constitutional protection has been put or all of the prohibitions that it may
embody.
609 See LEVY, supra note 13, at 414-31.
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In Brown v. Walker,610 one of its early disquisitions on the constitutional
privilege, the Court said:
The maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its origin in a protest against
the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused
persons, which has long obtained in the continental system, and, until the
expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the erection of
additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of
arbitrary power, was not uncommon even in England.... So deeply did the
iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves on the minds of the
American colonists that the States, with one accord, made a denial of the right
to question an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim,
which in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country
with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment. 6 11
Although this passage attributes to the constitutional privilege the objectives
underlying the common law protection, the Court did not particularize its
understanding of the objectives. Justice Field, however, sought to do so in his
dissenting opinion:
The essential and inherent cruelty of compelling a man to expose his own
guilt is obvious to every one, and needs no illustration. It is plain to every
person who gives the subject a moment's thought.
A sense of personal degradation in being compelled to incriminate one's
self must create a feeling of abhorrence in the community at its attempted
enforcement. 612
One may infer from this statement that the constitutional privilege was intended
to buttress the values of dignity and privacy and the interests in peace of mind
and controlling information about one's self.
Sixty-eight years later, in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,613 the Court
essayed its first detailed statement of the objectives of the constitutional
privilege, referring to them as "policies":
I. The Policies of the Privilege
The privilege against self-incrimination "registers an important advance in
the development of our liberty-one of the great landmarks in man's struggle
to make himself civilized." It reflects many of our fundamental values and
most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to
610 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
611 Id. at 596-97.
612 Id. at 637.
613 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for
an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear
that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and
abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by
requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is
shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with
the individual to shoulder the entire load;" our respect for the inviolability of
the human personality and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave
where he may lead a private life;" our distrust of self-deprecatory statements;
and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty,"
is often "a protection to the innocent." 61
4
There can be no doubt that this statement invests the constitutional privilege
with all of the values and interests that underlay the common law privilege: the
values of autonomy, dignity, privacy, and reliability, and the interests in bodily
and mental integrity. This is the settled view of the scholarly literature,615 and
it has been confirmed in the cases decided after Murphy.616 As was true of the
614 Id. at 55 (imternal citations omitted). This statement has been quoted often and
criticized almost as often. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 85, at 26; see also 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 3, § 2251, which antedates Murphy, but critically analyzes similar policy
considerations. A brief, but useful, discussion of the issue may be found in YALE KAMSAR
Er AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 698-702 (7th ed. 1990).
615 Professor Berger has perceived in the quotation from Murphy all of the values and
interests that inform the common law protection. BERGER, supra note 85, at 26. The
authors of MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) have identified
the value of dignity, id. § 114, at 424; § 118, at 433, and the underlying interest in bodily
integrity and freedom from torture. Id. § 118, at 433. Professor Arenella has identified the
values of privacy, dignity, autonomy, and reliability, Peter Arenella, Schrerber and the
Privilege Against Self-Incimination: A Reappraisal, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 31, 37, 40
(1982), although he downplays the reliability value. Id. at 40. Professor Fried has observed
that forcing a person to reveal self-deprecatory information is "profoundly humiliating."
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE LU. 475, 489 (1968). Thus, he sees the constitutional
privilege as an "example of a contingent, symbolic recognition of an area of privacy as an
expression of respect for personal integrity ..... "Id. at 488.
6 16 Two years after Mrphy, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority in Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), perceived in the constitutional privilege the value of
autonomy ("the right 'to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise
of his own will'"), dignity (the privilege insists that the government respect "the dignity and
integrity of its citizens"), and privacy (the "right to a private enclave where [one] may lead
a private life"). Id. at 460. A year later, in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), Justice Fortas
characterized the constitutional privilege as a manifestation of "the equality of the individual
and the state," saw it as a device for preventing the state "from overcoming the mind and
will of the person under investigation and depriving him of the freedom to decide whether
to assist the state in securing his conviction," and noted that the privilege is "related to the
question of the safeguards necessary to insure that admissions or confessions are reasonably
trustworthy". Id. at 47.
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common law privilege, however, the concern for these values and interests is
triggered only by official action. 617
Of the various objectives attributed to the privilege, only the reliability
objective has been questioned by the Supreme Court. In Tehan v. Shott,618 the
Court said, "The basic purposes... do not relate to protecting the innocent
from conviction, but rather to preserving the integrity of a judicial system in
which even the guilty are not to be convicted unless the prosecution 'shoulder
the entire load.'" Saying that reliability is not "basic" to the privilege,
however, is significantly different from saying that reliability is totally
irrelevant. Thus, the Court's statement about the constitutional privilege is not
inconsistent with our earlier analysis of the common law privilege under which
the reliability value is contingent or secondary, rather than primary. 619 A
similar analysis serves to explain the Court's more recent statement in Allen v.
Illinois that the constitutional privilege "is not designed to enhance the
reliability of the factfinding determination." 620
More difficult to deal with is the Court's most recent statement in
Colorado v. Connelly, that "[t]he sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on
which Miranda was based, is governmental coercion." 621 On its face, this
statement implicitly denies that the constitutional privilege is concerned even
secondarily with reliability. A closer look at the facts, however, suggests an
alternative interpretation. As noted earlier,622 Connelly was a schizophrenic
who was commanded by the "voice of God" to confess or kill himself. After
making incriminating statements on the street, he was taken to the police station
617 Id. See supra text accompanying notes 463-64 (common law privilege) and note
556 (constitutional privilege).
618 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966).
619 See supra notes 462-63 and accompanying text. In assessing the quotation from
Tehan, it is important to remember that the principal issue in Tehan was whether to give
retroactive effect to Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), which held that the Fifth
Amendment prohibited comment on the defendant's filure to testify at trial. At the time
Tehan was decided, the Supreme Court was more disposed to make a decision retroactive if
it advanced the reliability of the fact-determining process. See Francis X. Beytagh, Ten
Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REv. 1557, 1559 (1975).
The Court's statement in Tehan thus allowed it to lessen the disruptive effect of Griffin by
denying retroactivity to it. See id. at 1563-64. It may also have permitted some Justices to
vindicate their belief that Griffin was wrong. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 258
(1969) (Harlan, I., dissenting); Beytagh, supra at 1563, 1572-73. The statement in Tehan
should therefore be taken with several grains of salt.
620 Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 375 (1986) (emphasis added). The issue in Allen
was whether standards of due process required recognition of the privilege if the person's
compelled words could be used as a basis for involuntarily committing him as sexually
dangerous.
621 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986) (emphasis added).
622 See discussion supra at notes 592-93 and accompanying text.
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where a detective gave the Miranda advice and obtained a purported waiver.
Connelly then made additional incriminating statements. In arguing that the
purported waiver was invalid, Connelly claimed that his mental illness made
the waiver involuntary. The Court's response, that "[tjhe sole concern of the
Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, is governmental coercion,"
should be read to mean only that governmental action is an essential trigger for
Fifth Amendment analysis. It should not be read to mean that the constitutional
privilege has no concern for reliability, even in cases in which there is
governmental coercion. Thus, Connelly, in common with Tehan and Allen,
should be read as saying no more than that the privilege has no free-standing
concern for reliability, that is, a concern that is independent of governmental
coercion. 623 This, however, was also true of the common law privilege.
When we carefully consider the interpretation of the privilege by the
Supreme Court, we find that the values and interests underlying it are identical
to the foundational values and interests of the common law protection.
3. Objectives of the Due Process Rule624
Just as the Supreme Court has shaped the objectives of the constitutional
privilege, so has it shaped the objectives of the due process rule. Lurking in the
background of its decisions has been the common law protection, the purpose
of which was to improve the accuracy of the guilt-determining process by
excluding putatively unreliable confessions. In some respects, the due process
cases have fallen, short of this objective; in other respects, they have gone
beyond it.
In more than forty cases since 1936, the Court has had to consider whether
a confession was involuntary and why involuntary confessions should be
623 In his opinion for the Court in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 448 (1974),
then-Justice Rehnquist, who also wrote Connelly, alluded without comment to the view that
excluding unreliable confessions is one of the functions of the privilege.
624 For discussions that consider the subject in greater depth than is necessary in this
Article, see 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE AND JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRaMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.2
(1984); George E. Dix, Federal Constitutional Confession Law. The 1986 and 1987
Supreme Cowl Tennrs, 67 TEX. L. REV. 231 (1988); Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free
Will and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859 (1979); Herman, supra note 601, at
749-52; Herman, supra note 537, at 452-56; Yale Kamisar, What s an "Involuntary"
Confession? Some Conmments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confesions,
17 RUrGEs L. REV. 728 (1963); Monrad G. Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the
Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV. 411 (1954); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the
Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865 (1981).
Taken as a whole, these discussions look closely at the objectives of the due process
rule and find all of them problematic. By contrast, my concern in the present Article is
simply to identify the objectives and compare them with the objectives of the constitutional
privilege.
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excluded. From these cases, five objectives have emerged, the prominence of
each varying with the circumstances of the case.625 One of the objectives is
reliability. 626 Over the years, the Court has dealt inconsistently with this
objective, sometimes embracing it, sometimes rejecting it.627 The best face that
can be put on these cases is that reliability is a concern of the due process rule,
but not the sole concern. The putative unreliability of a confession is a reason
for excluding it,628 but even a demonstrably reliable confession may be
excluded if it was obtained in derogation of other objectives. 629
The other objectives that the Court has attributed to the due process rule
are (1) to deter the police from engaging in conduct so offensive to the
minimum standards of a civilized society that it shocks the conscience of the
Court; (2) to deter the police from violating the law, even though the violation
does not offend society's minimum standards; (3) to deter the police from using
the techniques of an inquisitorial system and to encourage the use of
accusatorial techniques; and (4) to deter the police from overbearing the
suspect's will. 63 0 The Court has not clearly delineated these objectives or
inquired into the values that underlie them, 631 but all seem to be offshoots of a
desire that government deal fairly with individuals. All seem to be premised on
the notion that even those who are suspected of crime are entitled to treatment
which minimally respects their dignity and their choice whether to expose their
own guilt. 632 The same notion, of course, underlies both the common law and
the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
625 "Thus a complex of values underlies the stricture against use by the state of
confessions which, by way of convenient shorthand this Court terms involuntary, and the
role played by each in any situation varies according to the particular circumstances of the
case." Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960) (emphasis added).
626 See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U.S. 199 (1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); see also Dix, supra note 624,
at 263-69.
627 For thorough discussions, see 3 WIGMORE, supra note 80, § 822 and Dix, supra
note 624, at 263-65.
62 8 This was so until Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). I assess the effect of
Connelly infra at notes 634-38 and accompanying text.
629 This is the point of Professor Chadbourn's careful analysis in 3 WIGMORE, supra
note 80, § 822, at 336 & n.22.
63 0 In setting out these objectives, I have freely plagiarized from myself. See Herman,
supra note 601, at 749-50. For similar statements of the objectives of the due process rule,
see sources cited in note 624, supra. Whether the due process rule has a free-standing
concern for free will, i.e., a concern independent of police coercion or overreaching, is
addressed infra in notes 634-36 and accompanying text. My statement in the text above
anticipates the outcome of that discussion.
631 See the sources cited in the two preceding footnotes.
632 See Dix, supra note 624, at 269.
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Until recently, the fact situations with which it dealt made it unnecessary
for the Supreme Court to spell out the relationship between the reliability
objective and the fair-play objectives. In the view of lower courts, however, the
due process rule demanded inadmissibility whenever there was a substantial
risk that a confession was unreliable, even if there was no official
misconduct.633 Then, in Colorado v. Connelly,634 the Court confronted an
unusual fact situation in which the arguable unreliability of the suspect's
confession flowed not from official misconduct, but from the suspect's
schizophrenia. In Connelly, the Court held that the due process rule is
concerned only with unreliability caused by official coercion. Thus, the rule
has no free-standing concern with unreliability. Even torture by private persons
does not require inadmissibility. State legislatures and courts are at liberty to
develop their own evidentiary rules to deal with unreliable confessions, but,
absent governmental coercion, unreliability is not a due process concern.
635
The due process rule, as shaped by Connelly, is the reverse of its common
law antecedent. The common law rule, according to Warickshall, is concerned
only with putatively unreliable confessions. Misconduct unrelated to
unreliability is outside its scope. By contrast, the due process rule is concerned
centrally with official misconduct. Unreliability is a secondary or contingent
concern, invariably dependent upon the presence of official misconduct.
Indeed, under Connelly's version of the due process rule, Warickshall's
confession would have been admissible, for it was induced not by official
action, but by the victim's promise not to prosecute.
633 See the state supreme court decision in Connelly, People v. Connelly, 702 P. 2d
722 (Colo. 1985). See also Palmore v. State, 12 So. 2d 854 (Ala. 1943) (private
investigators and others); People v. Haydel, 524 P.2d 866 (Cal. 1974) (store security
officer); Lawton v. State, 13 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1943) (victim's lawyer); Commonwealth v.
Mahnke, 335 N.E.2d 660 (Mass. 1975) (victim's family, neighbors, friends).
634 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
635 See id. at 163-67. The Court took the same line with reference to the due process
rule's free-will objective. According to the Court, the rule is concerned with impairment of
free will only if caused or exploited by governmental coercion. See id. Similarly, the Court
said that the constitutional privilege has no free-standing concern for free will. See id. at
169-70. For a thorough discussion of Connelly's treatment of free will, see Dix, supra note
596, at 288-313. It had been assumed prior to Connelly that a confession was inadmissible
under the due process rule for want of free will whether or not there was governmental
coercion or overreaching. Id. at 289-90; United States v. Raymer, 876 F.2d 383 (5th Cir.
1989).
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4. Objectives Compared
In his opinion for the Court in Allen v. Illinois,636 then-Justice Rehnquist
said that the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
"stands in the Constitution for [reasons] entirely independent [of
reliability]." 637 In support of the statement, he cited Rogers v. Richmond,638 a
case which was decided not under the constitutional privilege, but under the
due process rule. In Rogers, which was a product of the period in which the
Court was dealing inconsistently with the reliability objective of the due
process rule, Justice Frankfurter said that involuntary confessions were
excluded "not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the
methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement
of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial
system .... " 639 Had Allen been decided six months later, Justice Rehnquist
could have cited his own opinion in Connelly. Connelly deals with both the
constitutional privilege and the due process rule and treats them in the same
way. Under each, a concern for reliability is secondary. Under each, the
primary concern is inquisitorial, official action that fundamentally flouts the
sovereignty of the individual and its underlying values of autonomy, dignity,
and privacy. As a result of Connelly and other cases, the objectives of the two
constitutional protections are considerably more alike than were the objectives
of their common law antecedents. Indeed, it is hard to find any difference
between the objectives of the constitutional protections.
E. The Lessons of Constitutionalization and Interpretation
1. Introduction
Measured by the criteria of history, operations, and objectives, the
common law privilege and the common law confession rule were, as we earlier
saw, remarkably similar, although we found a small area within which the
confession rule functioned uniquely. Measured by the same criteria, the two
constitutional protections, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, are at least as
similar. As a matter of history, the constitutional protections derive from
substantially overlapping common law analogues, and a strong aversion to
torture is in the immediate background of each. Both constitutional protections
operate in similar fashion. Indeed, after Connelly, they operate more alike than
did their common law antecedents. The only operational differences are that
636 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
637 Id. at 375 (bracketed material added).
638 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
639 Id. at 540-41.
[Vol. 53:497
SELF-INCRIMINATION AND DUE PROCESS
balancing is impermissible when the privilege is asserted in ordinary criminal
proceedings, that due process analysis sometimes requires a consideration of
the "totality of the circumstances," and that the exclusion of evidence is the
primary role of the due process rule but only the secondary role of the
privilege. Also as a result of Connelly, both constitutional protections have the
identical objectives of protecting autonomy, dignity, and privacy from official
overreaching.
Even when Malloy was decided in 1964, the two constitutional protections
were remarkably similar. Thus, there may have been a nudge or a shove, but
there was no "shotgun wedding" when Justice Brennan cited the due process
cases as evidence that the Court had been applying the constitutional privilege
to state criminal proceedings all along. 640 Shotgun or no, however, the result
of Connelly is that the marriage partners voluntarily repeated their vows one
year short of their silver anniversary, for Connelly makes the two constitutional
protections almost identical.
2. A Question of Preference
If we have almost identical protections, should we use both or only one in
resolving cases? If only one, which one? In his dissenting opinion in Miranda,
Justice Harlan acknowledged that the two constitutional protections serve
similar values, but urged that the Court continue to apply the due process rule
in preference to the privilege: "Since extension of the general principle has
already occurred [in the due process cases], to insist that the privilege applies
as such serves only to carry over inapposite historical details and engaging
rhetoric and to obscure the policy choices to be made in regulating
confessions." 641 In Connelly, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that in cases
outside Miranda, "[t]he Court has retained [a] due process focus, even after
640 One must also acknowledge the prescience of Professor John Spanogle, who in the
same year argued that the due process cases made sense only if read as embodying the
values of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. John A. Spanogle, The Use of
Coerced Confesrions in State Cows, 17 VAND. L. REV. 421, 434-35 (1964).
641 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 511 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The Court's rejection of Justice Harlan's position and its use of the Fifth Amendment in
Miranda in preference to the due process rule do not moot the questions raised in the text.
Miranda is inapplicable to police interrogation if the suspect is not in custody. See Berkemer
v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (ordinary traffic stop is not custodial and thus does not
trigger Miranda). In such a case, a court must decide whether the standard for determining
the admissibility of a confession is provided by the privilege or by the due process rule. The
same is also true when a suspect, who has waived protection under Miranda, confesses and
then claims that his confession resulted from impermissible interrogation tactics. See Miller
v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985). Of course, the same question would apply to all
confessions should Miranda be overruled.
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holding, in Malloy v. Hogan, that the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination applies to the States." 642 As a matter of recent
historical fact, the Chief Justice is right,643 but why should the due process rule
be preferred to the privilege as the constitutional test for admissibility? After
all, the only explicit constitutional protection against compelled self-
incrimination is the Fifth Amendment's privilege. The Due Process Clause says
nothing about the subject. 644 It is a judicial construct that originated only as a
result of the fact that the privilege was not applicable to state proceedings until
1964. Had the Court not constructed a due process restriction on police
interrogation, confessions extorted by police brutality would have been beyond
federal constitutional reach. Assuming that the privilege applies to confessions
obtained by the police-a matter that I shall discuss later-it is quite likely that,
if the privilege had been applicable to state proceedings in 1936, it, and not the
Due Process Clause, would have been used to make the confession
inadmissible in the first state coerced confession case to reach the Court-
Brown v. Mississippi.645 In other situations, a specific constitutional provision
would certainly be applied in preference to a general one. 646 Particularly in
view of the fact that Connelly has stripped the due process protection of its
unique characteristics, there is no longer any point in applying the due process
protection. 647
6 42 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986).
643 See Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967).
644 "The 'voluntariness' test and its accompanying baggage is as much a 'judge-made'
or 'judicially created' doctrine as is the search and seizure exclusionary rule." Kamisar,
Reply, supra note 605, at 547.
645 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
646 An analogy may be drawn to the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. Before that
right was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and made applicable to the states,
the Court used the Due Process Clause. It held that fundamental fairness required the timely
appointment of counsel for the indigent in capital cases, see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.45
(1932), and in some noncapital cases. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). After the
Sixth Amendment was made applicable to state cases in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963), however, the Court did not continue to use the Due Process Clause in
preference to the Sixth Amendment. See generally Lawrence Herman & Charles A.
Thompson, Scott v. ]llinois and the Right to Counsel: A Decision in Search of a Doctrine?,
17 AM. CraM. L. REV. 71 (1979).
647 Lest I be misunderstood, I hasten to add that I do not necessarily agree with
Connelly's interpretation of the due process protection. Connelly has been roundly
criticized. See Lawrence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda. The Rehnquist Court's
Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U.L.Q. 59 (1989); Dix, supra
note 596; Kamisar, Reply, supra note 605, at 547 n.40; Noel Moran, Comment,
Confessions Compelled by Mental illness: What's an Insane Person To Do? Colorado v.
Connelly, 107 S.Ct. 515 (1986), 56 U. Ci. L. REv. 1049 (1988); Scott A. McCrerght,
Comment, Colorado v. Connelly: Due Process Challenges to Confessions and Evidentiary
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3. The Persistence of the Due Process Rule
Why, then, did Chief Justice Rehnquist point out in Connelly that "[t]he
Court has retained [a] due process focus" in the post-Malloy world?648 One
cannot know the answer to a certainty, but a plausible explanation is that the
Chief Justice perceives due process as a significantly less stringent limitation on
police interrogation because it permits balancing in the ordinary criminal
context. In the resolution of due process issues, including confessions, the
Court has engaged in a balancing of interests, including the societal interest in
police questioning.649 Although the Court has also engaged in a balancing of
interests in resolving some self-incrimination issues,650 it never uses balancing
to justify compulsory self-incrimination without immunity in the ordinary
criminal process, which is the "primary context from which the privilege
emerges." 651 Avoiding this position may have been the point of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's remark.
Reliability Interests, 73 IowA L. REv. 207 (1987). In a private conversation, Professor Yale
Kamisar suggested to me that the outcome in Brown v. Misisinpi would have been the same
if the confession had been obtained by the torturous acts of the Ku Klux Klan. In that event,
the Court would probably have found state action in Mississippi's use of the confession.
Justice Brennan has proffered the reasonable argument that a confession is presumptively
unreliable if made by a person who has a serious mental illness, and that due process bars
the admissibility of the confession until the prosecution overcomes the presumption by
"evidence extrinsic to the confession itself." Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 183
(1986) (Brennan, I., dissenting). But the present question is not whether Connelly is right. It
is whether, given Connelly, there is any point in preferring the due process rule to the
privilege as the constitutional test for admissibility.
Moreover, the question of preference would remain even if Connelly had been decided
differently. If Connelly had conferred on the due process rule the objectives and scope of
the common law confession rule, thus giving the due process rule a function not also served
by the privilege, the two constitutional protections would still overlap significantly. They
would still have the same general values, with the reliability value primary in the due
process rule but only secondary in the privilege. Most cases of police interrogation,
however, would fall within the area of overlap, and in those cases the question would
remain whether there is any reason to prefer the due process rule to the privilege.
648 479 U.S. at 163.
649 See supra note 603 and accompanying text, citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973).650 See supra notes 574-83 and accompanying text.
651 California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 440 (Harlan, J., concurring). As noted supra
notes 567-68 and accompanying text, New Jersey v. Portash flatly rejected balancing in a
case in which the state wanted to use compelled, immunized testimony to impeach the
defendant in a subsequent trial. In the Court's most recent case, Baltimore City Dep't of
Social Services v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990), discussed supra at notes 579-86 and
accompanying text, the Court, although not resolving the question of use, cited Portash and
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A closely-related explanation for the Chief Justice's preference is that the
very generality of the Due Process Clause may permit the Court to establish a
higher threshold for finding a violation than it has set under the privilege. The
tone of the present Court's due process decisions is exemplified by Moran v.
Burbine,652 a case in which a police officer told the suspect's lawyer that there
would be no interrogation even though he knew that interrogation was about to
begin. In support of his motion to suppress, the suspect argued that the
officer's conduct violated due process. This argument found favor with three
dissenting justices who posited a spacious due process test of "fairness,
integrity, and honor in the operation of the criminal justice system ..... 653
The majority, however, rejected the argument, adopting a much narrower
test-whether "the challenged conduct . . . so shocks the sensibilities of
civilized society as to warrant a federal intrusion into the criminal processes of
the States." 654 The Court recently put a finer point on the matter when it
admonished in Dowling v. United States that "[b]eyond the specific guarantees
enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited
operation." 655 It explained the narrow role by quoting from an earlier decision:
Judges are not free in defining 'due process' to impose on law enforcement
officials [their] 'personal and private notions' of fairness and to 'disregard the
limits that bind judges in their judicial function.' Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 170 (1952) .... [They] are to determine only whether the action
complained of violates those 'fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at
the base of our civil and political institutions,' Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S.
103, 112 (1935), and which define 'the community's sense of fair play and
decency,' Rochin v. California, supra, at 173.656
These passages may shed some light on the following statement from Connelly:
Indeed, coercive governmental misconduct was the catalyst for this
Court's seminal confession case, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
In that case, police officers extracted confessions from the accused through
brutal torture. The Court had little difficulty concluding that even though the
Fifth Amendment did not at the time apply to the States, the actions of the
police were "revolting to the sense of justice." Id., at 286. The Court has
retained this due process focus, even after holding, in Malloy v. Hogan, 378
strongly suggested that it was impermissible to use the evidentiary fruit of compelled
production on the criminal enforcement side of an essentially civil regulatory scheme.
652 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
653 Id. at 467 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall).
654 Id. at 433-34.
655 Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 353 (1990).
656 Id. (quoting from United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977)) (brackets
and omissions in original).
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U.S. 1 (1964), that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination applies to the States.6 57
The referent of the italicized word "this" is not clear. It may be merely any
quantum of coercive state action, thus implying a broad definition of due
process, or it may be only state action that falls so far below civilized standards
that all judges would find it "revolting to the sense of justice," a very narrow
definition of due process. One cannot tell from Connelly which alternative the
Court had in mind, but Moran and Dowling point in the direction of the latter.
Therefore, it seems plausible to read the Chief Justice's statement as insisting
that a confession should be inadmissible under the due process test only if the
police obtained it by conduct so egregious as to shock the conscience of the
CoUrt. 658
657 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986) (emphasis added).
658 Early in his judicial career, then-justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974), described the due process standard as involving
a determination of "whether the processes were so unfair and unreasonable as to render a
subsequent confession involuntary." Id. at 441. Then, from approximately forty involuntary
confession cases, he selected three against which to measure the facts of Tucker-Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); and Gallegos v.
Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962). Tucker, 417 U.S. at 448-49. Brown involved torture. In
Watts, the suspect was interrogated on five of the six days he was held. The interrogations,
by relays of police officers, often went into early morning hours. The suspect was deprived
of sleep and food and was kept in solitary confinement in "the hole" for a part of the
period. 338 U.S. at 53. In Gallegos, the suspect, who was 14 years old, was held
incommunicado for five days in "security" in a juvenile detention facility. 370 U.S. at 50.
The selection of these cases as a baseline suggests a narrow view of the due process
protection-a view that accords considerable latitude to the police to apply pressure to a
suspect as long as the police stop short of flagrant or outrageous action.
The narrow view of due process is a throwback to an earlier generation of confession
cases in which the Court held confessions to be voluntary despite the presence of substantial
pressure on the suspect including force and the threat of force. See Herman, supra note
537, at 456 nn.36-39 (collecting cases). It is incompatible with later cases such as Haynes
v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (confession held involuntary principally on ground that
suspect had been prohibited from calling his wife until he confessed). Chief Justice
Rehnquist's narrow view of the due process test is best illustrated by his opinion in Mincey
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 407-10 (1978). The suspect, who had been shot, was
interrogated in an intensive care room over a period of three to four hours. He was in pain
and encumbered by medical apparatus. His repeated requests for a lawyer were ignored.
Eight justices agreed that Mincey's confession was involuntary and therefore inadmissible to
impeach his trial testimony. Only Justice Rehnquist concluded that the trial court was
entitled to find the confession voluntary.
Although Justice Rehnquist's view did not prevail in Mincey, it is reflected where it
counts most-in the decisions of lower courts, almost all of which escape Supreme Court
review. See, e.g., Illinois v. House, 566 N.E.2d 259 (Dl. 1990) (confession voluntary even
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This narrow due process test stands in contrast to the broader protection
afforded by the privilege. Although the privilege's key word-"compelled"-is
imprecise, the Supreme Court has never held that a confession is compelled
only if induced by shocking misconduct (or, to take another major theme of the
due process rule, only by breaking the suspect's will). To the contrary, the
Court has explicitly and implicitly rejected these positions. In Malloy v. Hogan,
the Court said, "Under [the privilege], the constitutional inquiry is not whether
the conduct of state officers in obtaining the confession was shocking, but
whether the confession was 'free and voluntary,' 659 and in a host of other
cases, the Court has found compulsion even though the governmental conduct
was neither shocking nor will-breaking. 660 Thus, although the Fifth
though suspect was held in windowless, starkly furnished room for 49 hours, gave his first
inculpatory statement after 25 hours, and his first confession after 37 hours; suspect had
been fed, allowed to use the bathroom three times, allowed to make one telephone call, and
allowed to sleep on a table); Light v. Indiana, 547 N.E.2d 1073, 1079 (Ind. 1989)
(confession voluntary even though suspect was interrogated for four hours, one interrogator
repeatedly feigned great anger with the suspect, and officer gave suspect's arm a "mild
smack or tap" fifteen times "to keep him alert"); see also the cases and other authorities
collected in Herman, supra note 601, at 752-54.659 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964) (quoting Brain v. United States, 168 U.S.
532,542 (1897)).660 The cases are the very ones in which the Court refused to engage in balancing. See
Leflkowitz, v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805-08 (1977) (forfeiture of non-paid political
party office is compulsion); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 82-84 (1973) (forfeiture of
government contracts is compulsion); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 279 (1968) (loss
of public employment is compulsion); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 516 (1967)
(disbarment is compulsion); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (loss of public
employment is compulsion). In none of these cases could the pressure be described as
shocking. In all of the cases except Garrity, the witness refused to answer and was subjected
to a sanction. That the witness refused to answer demonstrates that the pressure was not
will-breaking.
In addition to the cases cited in this note, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457
(1966), in which the Court held that confessions were the product of inherent compulsion in
violation of the privilege even though "we might not find [them] to have been involuntary in
traditional terms." See also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 488 (1981) (Burger, ChJ.,
concurring) (suspect's purported Miranda waiver was made involuntary by jailer's statement
that suspect had to talk to police); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. at 499 (White, I.,
dissenting) (suggesting that answers are compelled if suspect is told he must answer). It is
also instructive to consult cases involving, or resulting from, legislative inquiries. See, e.g.,
United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, mn&fied, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 114 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1991). The legislative inquiry cases have shaped our perception
of how the privilege operates. When we watch a televised inquiry, we expect that the
witness will be advised by counsel; that the interrogator will honor the assertion of the
privilege by taking "no" for an answer and not pressing the same question; that questioning
will cease when it becomes apparent that the witness will refuse to answer all questions
calling for seN-incriminating answers; and that, if the need for information is great enough,
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Amendment's test is unclear, it is undeniably broader or more protective than
the due process test suggested by Connelly.661 The Connel/y test is so narrow
the interrogator will offer immunity. We thus expect a protective privilege. We would be
greatly surprised and perhaps offended if the interrogator continued to press the same
question or remonstrate with the witness for asserting the privilege, as occurred during the
"Army-McCarthy Hearings." See THOMAS C. REEVES, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JOE
McCARTHY 522 (1982). We would be even more surprised and offended if the interrogator
came close to using the sort of tactics that lower courts have upheld under the due process
rule. See authorities cited in note 658, supra.
It would therefore be inconsistent with both interpretation and perception to constrict
the constitutional privilege by looking only to the historical conditions that gave rise to the
common law protection. Justice Rehnquist, however, has tried to do precisely that. In his
opinion in Michigan v. Tucker, he said, "The importance of a right does not, by itself,
determine its scope, and therefore we must continue to hark back to the historical origins of
the privilege, particularly the evils at which it was to strike." 417 U.S. at 439-40.
Subsequently, he said, "A comparison of the facts in this case with the historical
circumstances underlying the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination strongly
indicates that the police conduct here did not deprive respondent of his privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination as such...." 417 U.S. at 444. See also New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984), in which Justice Rehnquist's opinion may be read to
equate Fifth Amendment compulsion with due process involuntariness. In neither of these
opinions did Justice Rehnquist discuss the cases cited above.
661 There has been a lively and interesting debate in the literature over whether
"compelled," in the Fifth Amendment sense, is more protective than "involuntary," in the
due process sense. For the view that it is, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering
Miranda, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 435, 440-46 (1987). For the view that it is not, see Joseph
D. Grano, Miranda's Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U.
Ci. L. REV. 174, 182 (1988). Professor Schulhofer's position rests on many of the cases
cited in note 660, supra. Professor Grano's position is complex and problematic. He denies
that the due process test is limited to will-breaking situations, but he fails to say what more it
includes. Id. at 182. He asserts that "the task, whether viewed in terms of Fifth Amendment
compulsion or due process voluntariness is 'to sift out undue pressure, not to assure
spontaneous confessions,'" id. at 183 (quoting Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 515 (1966)), but he does not discuss whether the
standards for determining what is "undue pressure" are the same in both contexts. Finally,
he reads the public employment cases cited in note 660, supra, not as prohibiting even
"mild pressures," id. at 183, but for the proposition "that the Fifth Amendment precludes
the state from asserting a claim of right to the defendant's testimony." Id. He fails to
consider, however, the implications of his own position with reference to police
interrogation. If the police do not have a claim of right to the suspect's confession, what do
they have? If they have no claim of right, what are they doing when they arrest a suspect,
detain him at the police station, and subject him to "mild pressures" or worse in order to
obtain a confession? If they have no claim of right, do they have to take "no" for an
answer, or may they persist? All of these questions lead ineluctably to a question of
overarching significance: is custodial interrogation incompatible with the police having no
claim of right to the suspect's confession?
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Although these questions are important and provocative, I do not intend to pursue them
in depth in this Article because they are collateral to my present thesis. My thesis is that in
delineating the constitutional standards for determining the admissibility of confessions
obtained by governmental action, the Court should prefer a textually relevant constitutional
provision (the Fifth Amendment privilege) to one that is textually neutral at best (the Due
Process Clause). Which of the two is more protective is not a matter of fundamental
concern to me at the present time. Even if the textually relevant provision were no more
protective, it would make sense to apply it. I raised the issue of which provision is more
protective only as part of a speculation about why Connelly seems to express a preference
for the textually neutral provision.
I realize, however, that the reader may be moved to reply, "If the privilege is no more
protective than the due process rule, why should courts worry about which doctrine to use?"
To head off that understandable reaction, I want to align myself with Professor Schulhofer.
In addition to what I have already said in the text and other footnotes, I believe that a
consideration of a few fact situations will demonstrate that the privilege is more protective
than the due process rule. The presence of Miranda has generally made it unnecessary for
the Supreme Court in recent years to examine the voluntariness of confessions. (Connelly is,
of course, an exception.) Consequently, in order to compare the protectiveness of doctrines,
one must assume either a case to which Miranda does not apply or that Miranda does not
exist. I shall assume the latter-that there is no requirement of advice and waiver, but that
the privilege is applicable to police interrogation. In light of this assumption, I now consider
several different scenarios.
Scenario # 1. Police arrest a suspect (5) and put him in a cell. An hour later, a jailer
arrives at the cell to take S to an interrogation room. S says, "I do not want to talk to the
police." The jailer says, "You have to." S confesses after a relatively brief interrogation.
This fact situation is drawn from facets of both Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981),
and the recent case of Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990). Under a due process
approach, the jailer's statement is but one of the totality of circumstances. A court would
not be required to suppress solely because of it. See supra note 601 and accompanying text.
Under the privilege, however, the jailer's statement is an impermissible claim of right to S's
self-incriminating information. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 499 (1964) (White,
J., dissenting); G3rano, supra.
Scenario # 2. Police arrest S and take him to the station for interrogation. S says, "I do
not want to talk to you. I want to talk to a lawyer." The officer ignores S's statement and
persists in interrogating S. S eventually confesses. This scenario combines the facts of
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (suspect invoked privilege), and Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (suspect invoked right to counsel). Under the due process
rule, a court would consider S's expressed wishes and the officer's persistence, but would
not have to give controlling effect to them. See, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433
(1957) (denial of suspect's request for counsel did not make confession inadmissible). Under
the privilege, however, the officer has to take "no" for an answer, just as an interrogator
would at a legislative inquiry. See supra note 660 and accompanying text.
Scenario # 3. Police arrest S and take him to the station for interrogation. S refuses to
answer questions until he is allowed to call his wife, but the police refuse to let him call until
he makes a statement and cooperates. They interrogate S and he confesses. This scenario is
an abbreviated version of Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963). Although a bare
majority of the Court held Haynes' confession inadmissible under the due process rule, I
[V/ol. 53:497
SELF-INCRIMINATION AND DUE PROCESS
that it will exclude few confessions, and that is apparently what some of the
Justices want. 662
There may be a third reason for Chief Justice Rehnquist's preferring the
due process approach-a tactical reason. Because balancing has long been a
part of due process analysis, it is unexceptional and taken for granted. Taking it
for granted entails two risks: that those who strike the balance will do so either
carelessly or with their thumb on the scale, and that those who observe the
balancing either will give it less scrutiny or will accept the results with silent
resignation. The second risk increases the first. In the context of the privilege,
however, balancing is extraordinary. Consequently, when a court engages in
self-incrimination balancing, even in connection with non-criminal, regulatory
schemes, as in Byers or Bouknight, it strikes a jarring note. The note is jarring
precisely because the Court seems to be creating an exception to an explicit
stricture against compulsory self-incrimination. That the note is jarring makes it
more likely that we will scrutinize and complain about the results. This, in
turn, may make it harder for those who strike the balance to put their thumb on
the scale. Another way of stating the same point is that due process balancing is
more likely to be of low visibility, and self-incrimination balancing is more
likely to be of high visibility. The Chief Justice's preference for the due
process rule may thus also evince a preference for the tactically advantageous
position of low-visibility balancing, a position that will enable the Court to
insure the admissibility of most confessions. 663
have no doubt that today's Supreme Court and virtually all lower courts would say that
Haynes' confession was voluntary. Under the privilege, however, the officer's refusal to let
Haynes call his wife until he confessed is a claim of right to Haynes' incriminating statement
as well as a refusal to take "no" for an answer.
As the privilege and the due process rule have developed in American law, it does
make a difference whether one uses the privilege or the due process rule to determine the
admissibility of the suspect's statement. Although the Court has the authority to reinterpret
the privilege so that it gives no more protection than the due process rule-a position that
Justice Harlan urged in his Garrity and Miranda dissents-it would have to ignore or
overrule the large body of case law on which Professor Schulhofer relies. It would also
have to explain the irony, which antedated Miranda, that a counselled witness at a televised
legislative hearing into matters of national significance was given more protection than a
suspect isolated with an interrogator at the police station.
662 1 am not saying, and I do not believe, that every member of the Connelly majority
subscribes to the views of the Chief Justice. For example, although Justice Stevens agreed
that the use of a confession does not offend due process in the absence of some coercion, he
is on record as supporting a due process test that is broader than "shocks the conscience."
See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 439-43 (1986). I do believe, however, that the Chief
Justice has planted a seed which he and some others may want to harvest at a later time.
663 In connection with the point made in the text, one would do well to remember that
the due process rule also impairs the effectiveness of judicial review. "The ambiguity of the
due process test and its subtle mixture of factual and legal elements discouraged active
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At bottom, all three explanations reflect what is surely no secret-that a
majority of the Court is hostile to exclusionary rules. Indeed, its hostility is
several times manifested in Connelly.664 Although hostility to the exclusion of
confessions may explain the Court's preference for a due process test, it will
not justify it. As I have already pointed out, the Fifth Amendment explicitly
prohibits governmental action that results in compelled self-incrimination and is
therefore textually relevant to interrogation. The Due Process Clause, however,
makes no explicit reference to self-incrimination and is therefore textually
irrelevant or neutral to interrogation. Connelly's suggested preference for a
textually irrelevant or neutral provision rests on no legitimate principle of
documentary interpretation. It is nothing more than result-oriented, social
engineering which is intended to insure that more rather than fewer confessions
will be admitted into evidence.
The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the question of whether
the Due Process Clause should be preferred to the Fifth Amendment as a test
for determining the admissibility of confessions in cases falling outside the
scope of Miranda. Beecher v. Alabama665 is as close as the Court has come.666
In Beecher, five justices held that a confession was inadmissible under the due
process test even though four concurring justices insisted that the Fifth
Amendment's compulsion test should be applied. The majority, however, never
addressed the question of preference, and its holding can hardly be taken as a
resolution of the issue. The time has now come for the Court to address the
issue squarely. There was a time when the due process test served unique
purposes, but Connelly has seemingly put an end to that. Consequently, the
time has also come for the Court to express its preference for the Fifth
Amendment's compulsion standard as the exclusive federal constitutional test
for determining the admissibility of a confession obtained by governmental
pressure.
Taking Connelly at face value, the only conceivable argument in favor of
retaining a due process test is that the Fifth Amendment's privilege is not
applicable to police interrogation. To that argument I now turn.
review even by the most conscientious appellate judges." Stephen I. Schulhofer,
Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REv. 865, 870 (1981). See also Herman, supra
note 601, at 752. By "subtle mixture of factual and legal elements," Professor Schulhofer is
referring not only to balancing but also to the fact that the due process rule sometimes
requires a court to consider the "totality of the circumstances." See supra notes 601-02 and
accompanying text.664 See 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986).
665 389 U.S. 35 (1967).
666 The Court did not resolve the issue in Connelly. In Connelly, the defendant took
the due process rule at face value and argued that his confession was inadmissible under it.
Conseqently, there was no need for the Court to'resolve the question of preference, and
Chief Justice Rehnquist's statement is dictum.
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V. COMPULSORY SELF-INCRIMINATION AND POLICE INTERROGATION
A. Introduction
Some who argue that the privilege and the involuntary confession rule are
wholly separate and fundamentally different rely on the claim that only the
confession rule is applicable to police interrogation. Wigmore is the prime
example.667 In my earlier discussion of Wigmore's operational arguments, I
deferred this point. The time is now ripe to consider it.
Although intimations of it survive,668 Wigmore's position has been
disavowed or ignored by most commentators. 669 Of greater practical
importance, it has been contradicted by the Supreme Court. In Brain v. United
States,670 the Court applied the privilege to hold inadmissible a confession
obtained by a Nova Scotian detective.671 After Bran, however, the Court did
667 8 WIGMoRE, supra note 3, § 2252, at 328-29; see also 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3,
§ 2266, at 401 ("The privilege covers only disclosures made under legal compulsion.").
668 See Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1446,
1468, 1473-74 (1985); Joseph D. Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need to Reconsider the
Constitutional Premises Underlying the Law of Confessions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 4,
36 (1979); Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA.
L. REV. 859, 927 (1979).
669 See, e.g., JOHN MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE, COMMON SENSE AND
COMMON LAw 82, 105, 121 (1947); CHARLEs MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 154-57 (1954);
EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 129-31 (1954); Kamisar,
Dissent, supra note 5, at 65-76; Kamisar, Equal Justice, supra note 5, at 25-32; Paul G.
Kauper, Judcial Eaninations of the Accused: A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 MICH.
L. REV. 1224, 1251 (1932); Roger 1. Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal
Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U. CI1. L. REV. 657, 674 (1966).
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 203 (1942) states, "Subject to [certain rules], every
natural person has a privilege, which he may claim to refuse to disclose in an action or to a
public offcial of this State or any governmental agency or division thereof any matter that
will incriminate him" (emphasis added).
The commentary to Rule 203 observes that the privilege "is applicable not only to
proceedings in court but also to all inquiries by representatives of the government." Id. at
134. That the drafters of the Model Code intended to include police interrogation is apparent
from illustration 2 in the commentary: "While investigating a homicide of A, who was
found dead in a small room, the police ask W whether he was present in the room at the
time of the killing. Wis entitled to refuse to answer on the ground of self-incrimination." Id.
To the same effect, see UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 25 (1953). The drafters of the
1974 revision did not codify the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and thus
omitted this provision from their work.
670 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
671 Id. at 542-45. Although three justices dissented, none objected to applying the
privilege to police interrogation. See id. at 569-73.
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not rely on the privilege, and it fell into disuse as a restriction on police
interrogation. In the 1950's and early 1960's, the applicability of the privilege
was still debated in the cases. 672 The beginning of the end of the case-law
debate occurred in 1964 when the Court held in Malloy v. Hogan673 that the
privilege applied to state proceedings. En route to this holding, it implied that
the privilege governed police interrogation. 674 Later the same year, in
Escobedo v. Illinois,675 the implication became stronger when the Court noted
that the police tried to "get" the suspect to confess "despite his constitutional
right not to do so," 676 and without warning him of his "absolute
[constitutional] right to remain silent." 677 Two years later, the Court dropped
the other shoe by explicitly holding in Miranda that the privilege applied to
police interrogation.678 This holding drew fire from dissenting Justices Harlan
and White who, relying on Wigmore, insisted that the privilege was historically
inapplicable to confessions obtained by interrogators who lacked the contempt
power to compel answers. 679
If Malloy was the beginning of the end of the case-law debate, Miranda
seemed to be the end of the end. Although Miranda remained controversial, the
contested issue was not the propriety of making the privilege apply to police
interrogation, 680 and, in the years after Miranda, the Court often described the
672 Compare the majority opinion in Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 190-91 n.35
(1953) (relying on Wigmore and disparaging Bran) with id. at 197-98 (Black, I.,
dissenting) (supporting Brain) and id. at 208 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (same) and Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 583 n.25 (1961) (same) (by implication) and Leyra v.
Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558 n.3 (1954) (same) and Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174
(1952) (Black, I., concurring) (same) and id. at 179 (Douglas, J., concurring) (same).
673 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
674 Id. at 6 (stating that Court's involuntary confession rule cases, which involved
police interrogation, were in fact applications of the privilege).
675 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
676 Id. at 485.
677 Id.
678 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
679 384 U.S. at 510-11 (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 526-28 (White, J., dissenting).
Only two years earlier, however, Justice White had complained in his Escobedo dissent that
the Court should have relied on the Fifth Amendment privilege rather than the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel as a restriction on police interrogation. See Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. at 497.
680 See Herman, supra note 601, at 735 n.18 (collecting commentaries), 737-40
(collecting cases). In January 1987, the United States Department of Justice released a
report that had been submitted almost a year earlier. The report urged the overruling of
Miranda. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATrORNEY
GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRE-TRIAL INTERROGATION (Feb. 12, 1986). Even in this
report, however, it was accepted that the constitutional privilege should apply to police
interrogation. Id. at 42.
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scope of the privilege so generously as to remove any lingering doubt about its
applicability to police interrogation. 681 Then, in 1986, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
referring to cases of police interrogation that were not governed by Miranda,
said, "The Court has retained [a] due process focus, even after holding, in
Malloy v. Hogan, that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination applies to the states." 682 One cannot know whether the Chief
Justice intended to revive the debate, but his words are susceptible to that
interpretation. 683 It is therefore within the realm of reasonable speculation that,
if the Court should ever overrule Miranda, it might, as did Justices Harlan and
White in Miranda, base a part of its rationale on Wigmore's insistence that the
privilege is inapplicable to police interrogation. For that reason, ignoring the
force of precedent and the weight of commentary, I now want to look at the
problem anew. First, I shall consider Wigmore's argument against applying the
privilege to police interrogation. Next, I shall ask whether the history,
operations, and objectives of the privilege justify not applying it to police
interrogation. Finally, I shall look at the problem from a general policy
perspective. All of these considerations will, I believe, amply demonstrate that
Wigmore's position is footless, and that the Court was right in both Brain and
681 In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-65 (1966), the Court held that the
privilege was not violated when a doctor obeyed a police officer's order to withdraw blood
from a suspect. The basis for the holding was that the blood was not a testimonial
communication. No member of the Court expressed any doubt that the privilege was
applicable to police proceedings. In Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973), Justice
White, writing for the Court, said the privilege was applicable not just in trial criminal
proceedings, but "in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the
answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings." Over a decade later, Justice
White quoted his own words approvingly in Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426
(1984).
One year after Miranda, Lord Reid, reviewing a number of English cases, some of
which involved police interrogation, said,
I do not think that it is possible to reconcile all the very numerous judicial statements on
the rejection of confessions but two lines of thought appear to underlie them: first, that a
statement made in response to a threat or promise may be untrue or at least
untrustwoxthy: and, secondly, that nemo tenetur sepswn prodere.
Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Harz, 1967 App. Cas. 760, 820 (appeal taken
from Eng.)
682 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986) (citation omitted).
683 Twelve years earlier, in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 442 (1974), then-
Justice Rehnquist quoted Wigmore's criticism of cases such as Brain which used the
privilege, instead of the involuntary confession rule, as a basis for excluding confessions
obtained by police. In New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 n.5 (1984), which was
decided two years before Connelly, Justice Rehnquist again posited the due process rule as
the alternative to Miranda.
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Miranda in assessing the constitutionality of police interrogation against the
standards of the privilege. 684
B. Wigmore's Argument
1. Genesis and Exegesis
In the third edition of his treatise, published in 1940, Wigmore said, "So
far as concerns principle, the two doctrines have not the same boundaries; i.e.
the privilege covers only statements made in court under process as a witness;
the confession-rule covers statements made out of court, but may also,
overlapping, cover statements made in court." 685 Wigmore did not really
intend to limit the privilege to court proceedings, for he earlier said that it
covered inquiries by legislatures and administrative agencies. 686 He did,
however, intend to limit the privilege to situations in which an interrogator
either had or could resort to the power of contempt to compel answers. This
impliedly excludes police interrogation. 687 Wigmore, however, did not
explicitly refer to the police or offer any justification for excluding from the
scope of the privilege inquiries unattended by the contempt power.688
684 I am not saying that Miranda correctly interpreted the privilege to require advice
and waiver. That much-debated issue is outside the scope of this Article. I am saying only
that Miranda rightly recognized that some version of the privilege was applicable to police
interrogation.
I believe it quite unlikely that the Court will overrule Miranda by holding that the
privilege does not apply to police interrogation. Should the Court ever be disposed to
overrule Miranda, the more likely ground will be that the privilege gives no more
protection than the due process rule and thus requires neither advice nor waiver. See
discussions supra at notes 11, 661 and accompanying text. Even the latter approach is not
very likely. Indeed, the Court recently turned aside an effort to avoid Miranda. See
Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S.Ct. 486 (1990) (police officer may not solicit a waiver from
suspect who has already consulted with counsel unless suspect first indicates willingness to
discuss the investigation).
685 8 WiGMORE, supra note 3, § 2266, at 387.
686 Id. § 2252, at 325-26.
687 See MORGAN, supra note 669, at 129 (Wigmore "seems to insist that the privilege
has no application to confessions coerced by the police").
688 At the end of the entire section from which the quoted passage is taken, Wignore
said, "[flor opinions making clear the distinction between the privilege-rule and the
confession-rule, see those of Campbell, CJ., in Reg. v. Scott, 1 Dears. & Bell 47, 169
Eng. Rep. 909 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1856), Selden, J., in Hendrickson v. People, 10 N.Y. 33
(1854), and in People v. McMahon, 15 N.Y. 386 (1857)." 8 WiGMORE, supra note 3,
§ 2266, at 388 n.3. It is not clear whether Wigmore viewed these opinions as supporting the
assertion that "the privilege covers only statements made... under process as a witness,"
or whether he saw them only as supporting other claimed distinctions between the two
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The 1961 revision of Wigmore's treatise explicitly refers to police
interrogation: "The privilege at common law did not apply to police
interrogations, and, in view of the development of the complementary
constitutional doctrine excluding coerced confessions, it is doubtful that there is
sufficient reason today to distort the privilege to cover this situation." 689 A
footnote offers the rationale for excluding police interrogation from the
coverage of the privilege:
Since police have no legal right to compel answers, there is no legal
obligation to which a privilege in the technical sense can apply. That is, it
makes no sense to say that one is privileged not to disclose-that one is
excused from the legal consequences of contumacy-when there are no legal
consequences of contumacy. 690
The words, however, are not those of Wigmore, who died in 1943, eighteen
years before publication of the 1961 revision. Rather, they are the words of the
reviser, Professor John McNaughton. McNaughton tried out an earlier version
of his position in 1960 when he spoke at an international conference on the
privilege.691 His speech was published in the same year. 692 In it, he asked,
"Does the privilege apply in the police station?" His answer was, "No, it does
protections. It is clear, however, that these opinions are irrelevant to the quoted assertion.
Scott, discussed supra notes 509-14 and accompanying text, does not address whether the
privilege is limited to situations of legal process. Nor does it deal with police interrogation.
Rather, it deals with bankruptcy proceedings from which the common law privilege was
withheld by statute.
Hendrickson involves neither police interrogation nor any distinction based on whether
a witness is called under process. In that case, a murder victim's husband was called as a
witness at a coroner's inquest and answered questions under oath without objection. He was
subsequently indicted for the murder, and his testimony was used against him. The court
held the statements admissible and affirmed the conviction. Judge Selden dissented. He
opined that the mental agitation of the witness made his statements inadmissible under the
involuntariness rule even if they did not violate the privilege. Selden's dissenting view in
Hendrickson became the majority view in McMahon, in which a murder suspect was
examined under oath at a coroner's inquest. For a discussion of on-oath examinations, see
supra notes 384-85 and accompanying text. Neither of Selden's opinions addresses any of
the issues with which we are now concerned. In my research for this Article, I did not find
any case decided during, or shortly after, the emergence of either the common law or the
constitutional privilege which distinguishes between examinations "under process" and other
examinations.
689 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2252, at 328-29.
690 Id. at 329 n.27.
691 See 51 J. CRIM. L.CRMIOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 129-30 (1960).
692 John T. McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Constitutional
Affectation, Raison d'Etre and Miscellaneous Implications, reprinted in CLAUDE R. SOWLE,
POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 223 (1962).
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not." 693 Appended to the answer was a footnote identical to the one quoted
immediately above. 694 McNaughton was apparently dissatisfied with his own
answer, however, for he promptly added, "But this is a quibble. Both policies
of the privilege which I accept, as well as most of those which I reject, apply
with full force to insure that police in informal interrogations not have the right
to compel self-incriminatory answers." 695 Yet, when McNaughton integrated
his article into his revision of Wigmore, he curiously omitted this passage, said
that it would be a distortion of the privilege to apply it to police interrogation,
and asserted, instead, his preference for the involuntary confession rule as the
sole restriction. 696
That the author of the most widely cited argument against applying the
privilege to police interrogation regarded it as a "quibble" is some reason not
to take it seriously. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opaque statement in Connelly,
however, is reason to do precisely the opposite and deal with the argument at
face value.
McNaughton's argument involves two premises: (1) that the protection
against compulsory self-incrimination is properly characterized as privilege
only; and (2) that evidentiary privileges exist only in situations in which a
questioner has or may resort to the power of contempt to compel an answer.
From these premises, McNaughton concludes that the self-incrimination
protection should not be applicable to police interrogation because police lack
the contempt power. Given his premises, McNaughton's conclusion is correct.
McNaughton, however, makes no effort to demonstrate that the premises are
correct; he merely assunes that they are. Whether they are correct is a question
that deserves some discussion.
2. Privilege Only?
I am going to give this question short shrift because there is less to it than
meets the eye. The word "privilege" is sometimes used in opposition to
"disqualification" or "incompetency." 697 It is also used in opposition to
"right." 698 One cannot tell in which sense McNaughton is using the word, and
693 Id. at 151.
694 Id. at 151 n.56. In the same footnote, after the quoted material, McNaughton fairly
set out contrary arguments.
695 Id. at 151-52 (emphasis added).
696 McNaughton did, however, include verbatim the reasons in support of applying the
privilege which he had mentioned in his article. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, at 329 n.27.
I have not tried to discover why McNaughton omitted the quoted paragraph. I suspect
that he was influenced by the publisher's loyalty to the memory of Wigmore. Had he simply
changed his mind, it is likely that he would have said so.697 See, e.g., MAGUIRE, supra note 669, at 78-92.
698 See infra notes 706-08 and accompanying text.
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it is therefore difficult to respond to his implication that the protection against
compulsory self-incrimination is properly characterized as privilege only.
The distinction between "privilege" and "incompetency" is not clear, 99
but scholarly discussions of the matter invariably classify the self-incrimination
protection as a privilege. 7°° In this sense, McNaughton's characterization is
amply supported.
Whether the self-incrimination protection is a "privilege" as opposed to a
"right" (another unclear distinction701) is a question that is apparently too
frothy for evidence scholars. I have found no discussion of it in any evidence
treatise, including Wigmore's, and scant discussion of it elsewhere. 7°2 The
common law protection against compulsory self-incrimination was not
originally called a privilege. Indeed, in cases that arose shortly after
establishment of the privilege, courts gratuitously intervened to prohibit
questions that sought incriminating answers. 703 Gratuitous intervention implies
a right and correlative duty.704 In later cases, however, courts waited until the
witness claimed the protection. 705 Judicial abstinence implies a privilege.
Regardless of the situation at common law, however, the protection we
have today comes from the Constitution. The Fifth Amendment does not
explicitly refer either to right or to privilege. Its language ("nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself"), however,
speaks to interrogators. It says that interrogators are under a duty to refrain
from compulsion, and thus implies that witnesses have a correlative right to be
free from compulsion. 7°6 At the same time, the constitutional protection is
administered in much the same way that courts administer evidentiary
6 9 9 See MAGUIRE, supra note 669.
700 See 1 McCoRMICK, supra note 417, ch. 13; MAGUIRE, supra note 669, at 102-
19.
701 See 3 ENCYCLoPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CoN5ruTION 1582 (1986) (discussing
the "Right-Privilege Distinction") (encyclopedia entry written by Dennis J. Mahoney and
Kenneth L. Karst).
702 See LEVY, supra note 13, at vii-viii (characterizing protection as a right); Benner,
supra note 246, at 62-63 (perhaps same).
703 See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
704 See Benner, supra note 246, at 62-63.
705 See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
70 6 In setting out arguments contrary to the one he posited in his revision of Wigmore,
Professor McNaughton said, "[A]lthough constitutional language in this area is not too
helpful, the self-incrimination clause in no instance grants, in terms, a 'privilege' to be free
from legal compulsion, but in most instances states simply that the person shall 'not be
compelled to give evidence against himself.'" 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2252, at 329
n.27.
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privileges. For example, both the constitutional protection and evidentiary
privileges must ordinarily be claimed. 707
The constitutional protection against compulsory self-incrimination thus
partakes of both right and evidentiary privilege, and it is feckless to assert that
it is a privilege only. Moreover, "one cannot refuse to answer questions until
questions are asked. A constitutional privilege is defensive, but it may be
asserted as of right. Thus, there is not necessarily a diminution of the right
against self-incrimination when that right is called a privilege." 70 8 If the
constitutional protection is both a right and a privilege or a right administered
as a privilege, then deciding on the correct label becomes a game that is not
worth the candle. In addition, even if we concede for the sake of argument that
the protection is primarily a privilege, in any sense of the word, it does not
follow that privileges must be linked to the contempt power. That is the more
important matter, and I turn to it immediately.
3. Are Evidentiary Privileges Inherently Linked to the Power of
Contempt?
McNaughton's second assumption focuses on nothing that is peculiar to the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Rather, it deals generally with
evidentiary privileges. Issues relating to evidentiary privileges ordinarily arise
in a judicial setting when a witness declines to testify on the ground of privilege
or when a party seeks to block testimony on the same ground. Thus,
evidentiary privileges are ordinarily contextually linked to proceedings in which
answers may be compelled by the contempt power. Professor McNaughton,
however, goes beyond context by asserting that an evidentiary privilege is
nothing more than an excuse "from the legal consequences of contumacy." If
"there are no legal consequences of contumacy," then there is no privilege.
Let's test McNaughton's position with a hypothetical case. Suppose my
wife tells me in confidence that she committed a crime. Subsequently, we are
both taken to the police station for interrogation. Asked whether my wife made
any statements to me about the crime, I reply, "I refuse to answer on the
ground that the information is protected both by the privilege for anti-marital
facts7°9 and the privilege for confidential communications between spouses." 710
707 See 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 417 § 84 (marital privilege); id. §§ 92-93, at 338-
43 (attorney-client privilege); id. at § 103 (physician-patient privilege); 8 WIGMORE, supra
note 3, § 2268 (self-incrimination privilege).
708 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSITIION 1582, 1583 (1986)
(discussing the "Right-Privilege Distinction") (encyclopedia entry written by Dennis I.
Mahoney and Kenneth L. Karst).
709 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, §§ 2227-2245 (chapter entitled "Privilege for Anti-
Marital Facts"). Others refer to the privilege as an incompetency. See JOHN J. MCKELVEY,
EVIDENCE 520 (5th ed. 1944).
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My wife, who is present, asserts the same grounds in refusing to let me
answer. Must the officer respect the invocation of these privileges and desist
from pressing me? Suppose he replies, "Neither of these privileges exists at the
police station, so you have to answer my questions." If I answer the questions,
has the officer violated my right, or my wife's, by inducing me to give
detrimental information that my wife had given to me in confidence?
Moreover, putting aside any hearsay objection, may the officer subsequently
reveal in court against my wife what I was induced to disclose?
I take it that McNaughton would not require the officer to respect my
assertion of the two privileges. He would say that the officer lacked the
contempt power, that there were "no legal consequences of contumacy," and
that neither privilege, therefore, existed at the police station. If the officer
induced me to yield the information, he did not act improperly. If it was not a
violation of either privilege to obtain the information from me in the first
instance, then it is also not a violation of the privilege for the officer to divulge
it in court against my wife.
I find these results strange. If I have correctly interpreted McNaughton, he
would let the state do indirectly what it cannot do directly. As long as the
privilege-holder objects, 711 the state cannot make me testify in court against my
wife. Denying the privileges at an official investigation and letting the officer
testify at trial are as offensive to the policies underlying the privileges as
compulsion in the courtroom. McNaughton's position is therefore contrary to
common sense. It is also contrary to the cases. These cases deal with anti-
marital facts rather than confidential communications. The cases do not directly
address whether the privilege was violated when the information was acquired
by the witness. Rather, they deal only with whether the witness may testify in
court. Although the cases are few, most of them hold the evidence inadmissible
at trial even though it comes from the lips of a third person.712 Trial
710 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, §§ 2332-2341 (chapter entitled "Communications
Between Husband and Wife").
711 In some jurisdictions, I would possess the privilege not to reveal anti-marital facts.
See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-49 n.9 (1980) (collecting statutes). In most
jurisdictions, my wife, as confidential communicant, would hold the privilege for
confidential, spousal communications. See 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 417, § 84.
712 See Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954) (affidavit submitted by
defendant's wife in a welfare matter relating to her mother was inadmissible to impeach
defendant's testimony in tax evasion trial; defendant, however, waived the privilege by
failing to object); United States v. Winfree, 170 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1959) (court denied
a pre-trial motion to suppress, but indicated that it would not admit at defendant's tax
evasion trial a statement given by defendant's wife to I.R.S. agents); State v. Suits, 251
S.E.2d 607 (N.C. 1979) (police officer not permitted to testify that defendant's wife gave
the officer a knife); Weaver v. State, 121 P.2d 1016 (Okla. Crim. App. 1942) (police chief
not permitted to testify that defendant's wife said that defendant controlled a closet in which
bootleg liquor had been found); contra, Parks v. State, 46 S.E.2d 504 (Ga. 1948) (police
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inadmissiblity implies that the officer offended the privilege by even obtaining
the information. 713
Professor McNaughton is therefore on shaky ground in assuming that
evidentiary privileges (including the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination) are inherently linked to proceedings in which the questioner has
or may resort to the power of contempt to compel answers. However, refuting
or questioning an argument is quite different from establishing its converse.
Even if McNaughton is wrong, it does not necessarily follow that the self-
incrimination protection should apply to police interrogation. Consequently, in
the next subdivisions of this Article, I shall ask whether the history, operations,
and objectives of the self-incrimination protection (which, for the sake of
convenience, I shall continue to call a "privilege"), set it apart from other
privileges and prohibit applying it to police interrogation.
C. Reconsidering History
1. Introduction
Before reconsidering the history of the privilege, I want to set the terms of
the discussion by identifying the question with which I am concerned. I shall
not try to prove that the history of the privilege requires applying it to police
interrogation. Rather, I am concerned with the converse: whether the history of
the privilege prohibits applying it to police interrogation? If the answer to that
question is "yes," then a powerful constraint will have emerged. If the answer
is "no," then we will be free to consider other matters. 714
2. The English Common Law Privilege
The history of the English common law privilege is replete with episodes
in which a person was brought before an adjudicative body, asked to take the
oath ex officio, and jailed for refusal. The slow development of the privilege is
thus associated with two phenomena: the authority to administer and insist on
the oath and the authority to punish refusal. But it does not follow that these
officer permitted to testify that defendant's wife gave the officer clothing belonging to
defendant).
713 Both Wigmore and McNaughton seem to approve of the cases. In his 1940 edition,
Wigmore wrote, "That which is privileged is testimony in any form, by the wife or husband
against the other. Extrajudiial adbnisons are a sort of testimony; hence, they are equally
privileged with testimony on the stand." 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2232, at 235 (3d ed.
1940) (cross-reference omitted). This statement appears in substance in the McNaughton
revision of 1961. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2232, at 225-26.
714 See Kamisar, Equal Jusdce, supra note 5, at 30 ("I do not claim that this long and
involved history displaces judgment, only that it liberates it.").
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matters of context are also matters of limitation, for history also discloses many
instances in which the recalcitrant's objection was not to the oath as such, but
to its incriminating effect, as well as instances in which persons refused to
incriminate themselves although examined without oath.
One of the earliest examples occurred in 1382 when John Ashton,
Wycliffe's disciple, took the oath at an ecclesiastical inquiry, but still refused to
answer questions about his religious beliefs. He was treated as though he had
confessed (pro confesso) and was imprisoned for heresy.715
Almost two centuries later, the situation was the same. In the 1550's,
during the height of the Marian inquisition, Protestant clergy refused to answer
questions about their religious beliefs. Their objection was not that an oath was
intrinsically wrong, but that it sought incriminating information.716
The ascension of Elizabeth in 1558 reversed the religions, but maintained
the inquisition. In 1569, some barristers refused to answer questions about their
religious practices even though "[t]he record does not reveal that the
commissioners required any of the fourteen lawyers whom they examined to
take the oath." 717 In the 1580's occurred the trials of Puritans Blake,
Wigginton, and Udall. Blake complained about compulsory self-
incrimination; 718 Wigginton claimed that self-incrimination was an unnatural
act;719 and Udall refused to submit to an examination either with or without
oath.720
By 1620, as Professor Levy has observed, "more and more people were
beginning to think that to coerce a man to testify against himself, with or
without oath, was simply unjust-an outrage on human dignity and a violation
of the very instinct of self-preservation." 721 As one example, Levy cites the
inquiry by the House of Lords into misconduct by Sir Giles Mompesson. The
715 See LEVY, supra note 13, at 55.
716 See supra note 84 and accompanying text; LEVY, supra note 13, at 77. Professor
Levy's discussion is based on JOHN FOXE, THE AcTs AND MONUMENTs OF JOHN FoXE
(London, R.R. Seeley & W. Burnside, Stephen Reed Cattley ed., 1837-41). The first
edition, published in 1563, and commonly referred to as the Book of Martyrs, recounts
various trials in great detail. Foxe's work was not available to me in toto, but I did read a
number of photocopied pages kindly provided by the Library of Calvin College. The pages
concerned the examinations of Protestant ministers Bland, Saunders, and Shetterdon. The
examinations show that the concern of the recalcitrants was not the oath as such, but the fact
that they were being asked to incriminate themselves. See 6 FoxE, supra, at 625-26
(examination of Saunders); id. at 290-301 (examination of Bland); id. at 306-10
(examination of Shetterden).
717 LEVY, supra note 13, at 97.
718 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
7 19 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
720 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
721 LEVY, supra note 13, at 263.
1992]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
investigating committee "urged none to accuse himself." 722 Another example
occurred nine years later when Charles sought an advisory opinion from the
judges as to whether it was a high contempt for a person to refuse to be
examined regarding treason. The judges replied that it was high contempt as
long as "this do not concern himself, but another, nor draw him to danger of
treason or contempt by his answer." 723 The answer appears to be a rather
broad statement of the nemo tenetur maxim, a statement that has nothing to do
with whether the examination is or is not on oath.
Around 1635, William Hudson published a treatise on the Court of Star
Chamber. His discussion of summary, oral proceedings contains a passage,
quoted much earlier in this Article,724 which may be read as saying that the
common law privilege was regarded as applicable to unsworn interrogations
conducted by royal messengers of persons whom they had arrested.725 Royal
messengers or "pursuivants" 726 performed some functions similar to those
performed by modem police officers. If the emerging privilege was regarded as
applicable to their activities, then the history of the privilege affirmatively
contradicts the Wigmore/McNaughton position.
There is no doubt that all of the developments in the long history of the
privilege began to coalesce late in 1637 in the first of the cases involving John
Lilburne.727 Lilburne's detailed account of the pretrial examination in that case
makes no reference to his being sworn. Hence, it is possible that he was not
put under oath. Whatever the case, his refusal to answer questions was based
not on aversion to an oath as such, but on his perception that the questions
were irrelevant to the charge and sought to elicit evidence of other crimes. 728
When his case moved from preliminary examination to trial in the Court of
Star Chamber, Lilburne resisted disclosure on many grounds, including his
unwillingness to supply evidence against himself when there was no other
722 Id. (quoting Proceedings in Parliament against Sir Giles Mompesson, 2 Cobbett's
State Trials 1119, 1123 (1620)).
723 Proceedings against William Stroud and Others, 3 Cobbett's State Trials 235, 237
(1629).
724 See supra text accompanying note 244.
725 See supra note 246.
726 See 2 GILEs JACOB, LAW DICrIONARY, (.E. Tomlins ed., London, A. Strahan
1797) (unpaginated) (defining poursuivant as "ItIhe King's messenger attending him, to be
sent on any occasion or message; as for the apprehending a person accused or suspected of
any offence").
727 See supra notes 193-202 and accompanying text. Lilbume's own account of the
case is reported in Trial of John Lilburne and John Wharton, 3 Cobbett's State Trials 1315
(1637).
728 See id. at 1318.
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evidence of wrongdoing.72 9 Punished for contempt, he said from the pillory
that self-accusation was against the self-protective law of nature.730
In 1641, Parliament, having been convened by King Charles in 1640 to
raise money in defense of impending civil war, abolished the courts of High
Commission and Star Chamber and made it criminal to administer the oath ex
officio in church proceedings.731 The oath thus faded as a datum in the
development of the privilege, but the privilege continued to develop. Although
the bill did not purport to affect parliamentary proceedings, Parliament
forebore to compel even unsworn self-incrimination in Proceedings against the
7Tw1lve Bishops.732 Thus, as it had done two decades earlier in the Mompesson
inquiry, Parliament recognized that the privilege was not limited to judicial
proceedings.
But Parliament was fickle. In 1645, it jailed Lilburne for refusing to
answer questions in a parliamentary inquiry into an alleged criminal libel. 73 3
Lilburne's refusal, however, indicated his view that the privilege of silence was
not limited to judicial proceedings. Indeed, while he was in jail, he wrote a
tract broadly claiming that no governmental authority could engage in the
practices that had been outlawed with the abolition of Star Chamber. 73 4
Lilburne even went so far as to question the common-law practice of
interrogating defendants in criminal proceedings. 73 5
729 See id. at 1322.
730 See id.
731 See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
732 See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text. Parliament's forebearance
occurred after the Bishops, who were unswom, declined to give self-incriminating
information.
733 LEVY, supra note 13, at 289.
73 4 See LEVY, supra note 13, at 290; see also supra note 207 and accompanying text.
735 See supra note 207 and accompanying text. Lilburne's tract is reprinted in 3
WILLIAM HALLER, TRACTS ON LIBERTY IN THE PURrTAN REVOLUTION 1638-1647, at
258-307 (1934). Lilbume's concern about interrogation in common law proceedings is
voiced in HALLER, supra at 266. In ordinary criminal proceedings, there was unswom
interrogation of the accused at preliminary examination and unsworn interrogation of the
defendant at trial. See supra notes 124, 142 and accompanying text. That Lilbume
questioned these practices shows that his conception of the privilege was not linked to an
oath.
To avoid confusion, I want to repeat what I said about oaths, supra text accompanying
note 385. The oath cc officido was quite different from the oath with which we are familiar
today. The modem oath does not absolutely obligate the witness to answer. For various
legally recognized reasons, the witness may refuse. If the witness chooses to answer,
however, we demand that the answer be truthful. The oath ex officio also sought the truth.
Of much greater importance, however, it obligated the witness to answer. A part of the
history of the privilege is conteua/ly linked to the oath ex officio. However, the privilege
was asserted even after the disappearance of that oath. See infra notes 736-43 and
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Lilburne was again jailed in 1646 when he refused to answer questions at
another parliamentary inquiry. 736 Lilburne's friend and ally Richard Overton,
who came to Lilburne's defense, was also jailed, but managed to circulate a
pamphlet in which he insisted that no governmental authority should force any
person to incriminate himself.737 In 1647, this theme was repeated in a Leveller
petition which urged the House of Commons to permit "no authority
whatsoever" to compel self-incrimination. 738 A year later, Lilburne and
Overton were freed and complained that the Commonwealth government,
which had overthrown Charles I, had merely substituted its own form of
tyranny for the Star Chamber and High Commission.739
The year 1649 saw a great irony: the trials for high treason of both Charles
I and Lilburne, who had helped to oust him. Each trial contributed something
to the development of the privilege. In the trial of Charles, the protection was
extended, apparently for the first time, to a nonparty witness. 740 The
proceedings against Lilburne began with a preliminary inquiry conducted by
John Bradshaw, presiding officer of the Council of State. Although Lilburne
knew that Bradshaw was merely gathering evidence for trial, not then trying
him, Lilburne refused to answer, thus manifesting, as he had in 1637, his belief
that the protection against compulsory self-incrimination was applicable to
pretrial, evidence-gathering proceedings. 741 At his trial, which resulted in an
acquittal, Lilburne continued to complain about Bradshaw's effort to get
information from him.742
In 1651, Lilburne was banished after a summary conviction for defaming a
member of Parliament. He returned in 1653, was tried for violating the
banishment order, and was acquitted by a maverick jury. Parliament then asked
the Council of State to examine the jury apparently for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the jury had been bribed. Although the inquiry was pre-
charge, not just pretrial, some jurors refused to answer. 743
There had been some acknowledgement of a privilege of silence before
Lilburne's banishment. In the decades after Lilburne's death in 1657, even
accompanying text. Lilburne's attack on the unsworn examination of suspects and
defendants in ordinary criminal cases divorces the privilege from any oath.
736 See LEVY, supra note 13, at 292; see also supra notes 207-08 and accompanying
text.
737 See LEVY, supra note 13, at 293-94; see also supra text preceding note 208.
738 See LEVY, supra note 13, at 296; see also supra note 209 and accompanying text.
739 See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text.
740 See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
741 See LEVY, supra note 13, at 299; see also supra note 211 and accompanying text.
The 1637 examination is discussed supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
742 Trial of John Lilburne, 4 Cobbett's State Trials 1269, 1280 (1649).
743 See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
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during the turmoil of the Restoration, the privilege was firmly recognized and
generously applied. 744
This brief recapitulation of the history of the English common law
privilege lends no support to the Wigmore/McNaughton position. It is, of
course, true that, with the possible exception of William Hudson's reference to
royal messengers, 745 the history discloses no linkage of the privilege to
"police" interrogation. The simple reason for this, however, is that the first
police department in England was not formed until 1829, and the first detective
branch was not formed until 1842.746 Until the beginning of the nineteenth
century, interrogation was essentially a judicial or quasi-judicial task.747
Although law enforcement officers existed during the formative period of the
privilege, their function was to keep the peace and apprehend offenders, not to
interrogate.
What the history of the English common law privilege does show is that
the privilege was broadly conceived and applied. Part and parcel of the "first
great outburst of democratic thought in history," 748 it was not originally
limited to incrimination, but protected against loss of reputation; it was not
limited to defendants, but protected witnesses; and it was not limited to judicial
proceedings, but came to restrict all of the agencies which then engaged in
interrogation. 749 It was asserted in adjudicative proceedings, pre-adjudicative
examinations, and even in pre-charge inquiries. It was used as a defense against
the oath ex officio, but also to fend off unswom examination.
Even after the disappearance of the oath ex officio, the privilege was
contextually linked to the contempt power of official agencies of interrogation.
But nothing in the history of the privilege suggests that this was regarded as a
limitation. To the contrary, there is every reason to believe that those who
744 See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text.
745 See supra notes 244, 246 and accompanying text.
746 Kamisar, Dissent, supra note 5, at 66 n.41.
747 See id.
748 See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
749 I stand by the statement in the text even though, as the detailed history discloses,
supra notes 124, 142, 174, 175, 221, 225-31 and accompanying text, in ordinary criminal
cases the self-represented accused was subjected to both trial and pre-trial interrogation.
There is no evidence that defendants were jailed or threatened with jail for refusing to
answer questions at trial, and refusal was common. See 1 STEPHEN, HISTORY, supra note
81, at 358. As the 17th century closed, so largely did the practice of trial interrogation. See
supra note 224 and accompanying text. As far as pretrial interrogation was concerned,
neither force nor the threat of contempt was used to compel answers. See supra notes 225-
31 and accompanying text. Some judges did use tricks to induce confessions or threatened
to withhold bail if the suspect did not confess. See supra notes 228-30 and accompanying
text. Neither tactic, however, was necessarily inconsistent with an evolving privilege. See
supra text accompanying note 235. The privilege, it should be remembered, was to refuse
to answer questions, not to be free from being asked.
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were instrumental in the development of the privilege would have protested just
as loudly against alternative tactics for compelling self-incrimination. Suppose
that when Lilburne refused to answer Bradshaw's questions, Bradshaw said,
"Then I will beat you with my truncheon, or I and a few colleagues will keep
asking you questions until we wear you down," or "I will turn you over to the
constable, and he will beat you with his truncheon, or he and a few of his
colleagues will keep asking you questions until they wear you down." In any of
these cases, is it believable that Lilburne, not having been threatened with jail
for contempt, would have gone "gentle into that good night" by incriminating
himself? 750 Absolutely not. Lilburne would have "burn[ed] and rave[d]" 751
against compulsory self-incrimination in any context. The essence of the
asserted, and eventually accepted, privilege was that any form of governmental
compulsion to incriminate was incompatible with human dignity, not just the
contempt power.
Had I earlier assumed the burden of proving that the history of the English
common law privilege requires applying it to police interrogation, I would rest
content in the belief that I had carried the burden. But that was not what I set
out to do. Rather, I was concerned only with whether history prohibits
applying the privilege to police interrogation. The answer to that question
surely has to be "no." 752
3. The American Common Law and Constitutional Privileges
It would serve no useful purpose to try to summarize the rather sparse
history of the American common law and constitutional privileges. It is enough
to observe that the American privileges evolved from the same forces and in
the same contexts as their English counterparts; 753 that a concern about torture
prominently underlay both American privileges, 754 and was part of the
backdrop against which the English privilege developed; 755 that judicial
interrogation was equally common and police interrogation equally unknown
on both sides of the Atlantic during the period in question; 756 and that in the
early days, both state and federal constitutional privileges were generously
750 The quoted words are from Dylan Thomas's poem, "Do Not Go Gentle Into That
Good Night," in DEATH IN IrEPATURE 384 (Robert F. Weir ed., 1980).
751 Id.
752 For a similar conclusion, see Comment, Adoptive Admissions, Arrest and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Suggested Constitutional Imperative, 31 U. Cn. L.
REv. 556, 559-63 (1964).
753 See generally supra notes 318-37 and accompanying text. However, there does
seem to be less of the oath ex officio in the American history.
754 See supra notes 326, 334, 551 and accompanying text.
75S See supra notes 84, 130, 188-90, 200, 402-08, 416 and accompanying text.
756 See Kauper, supra note 122, at 1231-37.
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interpreted by the courts.757 There is nothing in the history of either American
privilege that gives greater support to the Wigmore/McNaughton position than
it derives from the English common law privilege.
D. Reconsidering Operations
Nor does the Wigmore/McNaughton position find support in the operations
of the common law and constitutional protections. Both protections shield
actual and potential criminal defendants;758 both are directed against
governmental action; 759 both may be asserted in a variety of proceedings:
judicial (including grand jury), non-judicial (legislative, administrative),
adjudicative, non-adjudicative, criminal, and civil;760 and both have the
primary effect of fending off an inquiry and the secondary effect of excluding
evidence improperly obtained. 761 None of these operations is incompatible with
applying the privilege to police interrogation.
E. Reconsidering Objectives
1. The Common Law Privilege
The common law privilege served certain collateral objectives. 762 The
privilege was a "surrogate for freedom of conscience in the battle against state
757 See supra note 336 and accompanying text. Some American courts gratuitously
protected witnesses and interpreted the word "incriminate" broadly enough to protect civil
and reputational interests.
758 See supra note 376 and accompanying text (common-law privilege); McCarthy v.
Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924) (constitutional privilege).
759 See supra notes 463-64 and accompanying text (common-law privilege), and note
550 and accompanying text (constitutional privilege).
760 The previous discussion of the common law privilege clearly establishes the
availability of the privilege in judicial, legislative, and administrative proceedings. See supra
notes 218-23 and accompanying text (udicial), notes 206, 207, 290 and accompanying text
(legislative); Reg. v. Sloggett, 7 Cox Crim. Cas. 139 (Eng. Crim. App. 1856) (privilege
applicable at bankruptcy examination). The constitutional privilege has the same coverage.
See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955) (legislative inquiry); McCarthy v.
Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924) (bankruptcy proceeding); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547, 562 (1892) (grand jury). In his concurring opinion in Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964) (dictum) (White, I., concurring), Justice White summed
up the operation of the constitutional privilege by saying, "It]he privilege can be claimed in
any proceeding, be it criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or
adjudicatory...."
761 See supra note 374 and accompanying text (common law privilege), and notes
558-60 and accompanying text (constitutional privilege).
762 See supra notes 429-30 and accompanying text.
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control of religious and political beliefs and speech." 763 The privilege also
asserted a fair-play entitlement to notice of the charges and confrontation of
accusers. Although these uses have been largely replaced by other protections,
neither use is inconsistent with applying the privilege to police interrogation.
The direct objective of the common law privilege was to protect and
preserve individual sovereignty and its underlying values and interests. 764 The
values underlying individual sovereignty are autonomy, dignity, and privacy.
Underlying autonomy and dignity is an interest in bodily integrity. The
common law privilege protected this interest by condemning torture. This
interest is fully applicable to police interrogation. Indeed, the remnants of
physical brutality in modem interrogation practice are more likely to occur in
police interrogation than in any other governmental setting.765
Underlying the values of autonomy and privacy is an interest in mental
integrity (repose, peace of mind, control over what others learn about one's
self). The common law privilege protected this interest by condemning torture
and the threat of torture, which engendered fear; by condemning browbeating,
jail, and the threat of jail, which created stress; by condemning the unnatural
act of self-incrimination, which also created stress; and by condemning all
coercion which led to a loss of control over intimate information. This
objective, too, is fully applicable to police interrogation. Although the police
do not have a monopoly on these practices, and although they lack the legal
authority to commit someone to jail for contempt, the police do use techniques
of pressure to extract intimate information. 766
Underlying all of the values and interests of individual sovereignty is the
contingent or secondary objective of obtaining reliable confessions and
avoiding the conviction of innocent people. The common law privilege
vindicates this objective by condemning all forms of compulsion. That this
objective applies to police interrogation is beyond argument.767 Indeed, the
763 Id.
764 See supra note 432 and accompanying text.
765 See Note, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Does It E-dst in the Police
Station?, 5 SrAN. L. REV. 459, 476 (1953). Some cases involving police brutality are
discussed in Herman, supra note 601, at 733,753,754 n.156 (1987).
766 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2252, at 329 n.27 ("methods to compel
disclosure threatened or used by police may be more fearsome than those threatened or used
by a court"); Alfred C. Clapp, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 10 RUTGERs L. REV.
541, 544 (1956) (risk of police coercion supplies the need for the privilege at police
interrogation); Note, supra note 765, at 476 (protracted questioning is more likely to occur
at police station than in court).
767 See Note, supra note 765, at 477 (recognizing the risk of unreliability in some
confessions obtained by police interrogation).
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same objective is at the core of the common law involuntary confession rule,
which clearly applies to police interrogation. 768
2. The Constitutional Privilege
The same objectives underlie both the common law and the constitutional
privileges. 769 If the objectives of the common law privilege apply to police
interrogation, the same is necessarily true of the constitutional privilege.
3. Conclusion
In his 1960 speech and article, Professor McNaughton identified twelve
policies advanced in justification of the common law and constitutional
privileges. He rejected eight, was lukewarm about one (the privilege as
surrogate for freedom of conscience), took no position on another (the privilege
as a device for fending off random fishing expeditions), and accepted two. 770
The eight he rejected are, for the most part, either redundancies or post facto
rationalizations that have nothing to do with the forces that led to the privilege.
The two he accepted (the avoidance of inhumane treatment and the right to be
let alone) lie at the core of individual sovereignty and overlap the values and
interests advanced in the discussion above. Speaking of the entire group of
twelve policies, McNaughton concluded: "Both policies of the privilege which
I accept, as well as most of those which I reject, apply with full force to insure
that police in informal interrogations not have the right to compel self-
incriminatory answers." 771 As well as anything in the field, McNaughton's
analysis and conclusion refute the position he himself took a year later in the
1961 revision of Wigmore's evidence treatise. As McNaughton recognized, the
policies underlying the privilege not only permit applying it to police
interrogation, they require applying it. Indeed, the case for applying the
privilege is even stronger than McNaughton realized. As discussed earlier in
this Article, the common law privilege and the common law confession rule
have related histories and similar operations and objectives. As a result of
Connelly, however, the constitutional privilege and the constitutional
confession rule are even more alike than their common law counterparts.
Connelly treats both the constitutional privilege and the constitutional
confession rule in the same way. As I stated earlier:
768 See supra notes 302, 348, 351, 357, 358 and accompanying text.
769 See supra notes 615-17 and accompanying text.
7 70 McNaughton, supra note 692, at 142-51.
771 Id. at 151-52.
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Under each, a concern for reliability is secondary. Under each, the primary
concern is inquisitorial, official action that fundamentally flouts the sovereignty
of the individual and its underlying values of autonomy, dignity, and privacy.
As a result of Conney and other cases ... it is hard to find any difference
between the objectives of the constitutional protections. 772
Given the fact that the constitutional confession rule was created for cases of
police interrogation, there is even more reason today than when McNaughton
wrote for applying the indistinguishable privilege to police interrogation.
F. Policy Considerations
Even if the lessons of history, operations, and objectives were less clear,
there would remain a strong need for applying the privilege to police
interrogation.
Canvassing the arguments for and against the privilege in 1935, Wigmore
himself gave currency to the argument that the privilege was needed more in
preliminary inquiries than at trial.773 However, he focussed his discussion on
grand juries and rogue prosecutors and did not carry it into the police
interrogation room. Five years later, in the third edition of his treatise,
Wigmore enlarged the point:
The exercise of the power to extract answers begets a forgetfulness of the just
limitations of that power. The simple and peaceful process of questioning
breeds a readiness to resort to bullying and to physical force and torture. If
there is a right to an answer, there soon seems to be a right to the expected
answer-that is, to a confession of guilt. Thus the legitimate use grows into the
unjust abuse .. 774
Again, however, Wigmore directed his point against prosecutors and either did
not see or chose to ignore its practical relevance to police interrogation.
Professor McNaughton picked up the cudgel in 1961. McNaughton,
however, was keenly aware that Wigmore's point applied as well, if not better,
to police interrogation.
[The reasons that support the privilege]-in varying degrees of intensity
depending on the particular witness, the particular question, the particular kind
of tribunal, the particular setting in which the question is asked-often merge
like notes from the pipes of an organ to produce a chord of unanalyzable
impact. The impact of the chord is most ominous and impressive when
772 Supra note 639 and accompanying text.
773 1oHN H. WIGMORE, A STUDENTS' TExTBooK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 388-
89 (1935).
774 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251, at 309 (3d ed. 1940).
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questions are put by police (where, ironically, it is doubtful that the privilege
as such is recognized at all) .... 775
Yet, when push came to shove, McNaughton suppressed the irony and flatly
asserted that the privilege did not apply to police interrogation.
McNaughton was wrong. The need for applying the privilege to police
interrogation is as great as in any other setting and greater than in some to
which the privilege has long been held applicable. In the early scheme of
things, the Marian statutes conferred upon magistrates an evidence-gathering or
detective-like role which they played in preliminary proceedings. 776 Although
some magistrates were abusive and used pressure and tricks to obtain
confessions or admissions, they did not use force or the power of contempt. 777
The privilege applied to the magistrate's proceeding. Indeed, early writers
regarded the nemo tenetur maxim as applicable even before it became firmly
rooted in English law. 778
The evidence-gathering role of the magistrate began to wane in the early
part of the nineteenth century and came to an end in 1848 when Lord Jervis's
Act repealed the Marian statutes. 7 79 Contributing to the decline of the
magistrate was the emergence of police departments with detective divisions
and their assumption of the magistrate's evidence-gathering role.780 The need
for the privilege, however, did not diminish with the end of the magistrate's
role. Although the police are not legally entitled to insist on answers and lack
the power to cite for contempt, many suspects assume that the officer is entitled
to an answer or that silence will incur some sanction.78 1 In the days before
Miranda, these misconceptions were abetted by the police, some of whom
misrepresented that there was a legal obligation to answer78 2 and all of whom
775 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2252, at 318.
776 See supra note 122 and accompanying text; see also LEVY, supra note 13, at 325;
Kauper, supra note 122, at 1232-33.
7 77 See supra notes 225-30 and accompanying text.
778 DALTON, supra note 124; FInZHERBERT & CROMPTON, supra note 125;
LAMBARD, EIRENARcHA, supra note 135.
779 An Act to Facilitate the Performance of the Duties of Justices of the Peace Out of
Sessions Within England and Wales With Respect to Persons Charged with Indictable
Offences, 1848, 11 & 12 Vict., ch. 42, § 18 (Eng.) 88 STAT. AT LARGE (Eng.), 204. The
development is described in Kauper, supra note 122, at 1234.
780 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2252, at 329 n.27; Kamisar, Dissent, supra note 5, at
73-74; Kamisar, Equal Justice, supra note 5, at 29-30; Kauper, supra note 122, at 1234.
781 Kamisar, Dissent, supra note 5, at 65; Kamisar, Equal Justice, supra note 5, at 31-
32.
782 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2252, at 329 n.27. Even after Miranda the problem
remains. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486, 488-89 (1990) (jailer told suspect that
he had to talk with officer); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 479 (1981) (same). In
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acted as though they were entitled to an answer. 783 In terms of need, the case
for applying the privilege to police interrogation is at least as strong as the case
for applying the privilege to the magistrate's examination.
A separate facet of the need for the privilege is that the risk of criminal
prosecution, conviction, punishment, and abusive interrogation is much greater
in the police interrogation setting than in any other interrogational setting. It
has long been held that the privilege may be claimed in civil proceedings and
legislative inquiries, even though neither is itself a "criminal case" within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment and even though the risk of prosecution may
be remote.784 That these proceedings are open to the public (indeed, that they
may be televised), that the witness may be represented by counsel, and that the
interrogator is therefore not likely to be abusive do not defeat the privilege. By
contrast, police interrogation is "criminal" and its very purpose is to obtain
evidence for use in a criminal prosecution; the fruits of police interrogation
lead to criminal charges far more frequently than do the fruits of civil or
legislative questioning; and, as noted earlier, abusive practices are more likely
to occur in the interrogation room than in any other governmental setting.785
To apply the privilege in these former settings while denying application to
police interrrogation stands the privilege on its head.
If nothing intrinsic to the general concept of evidentiary privilege prohibits
applying the self-incrimination privilege to police interrogation, then the need
for the self-incrimination privilege should weigh in the balance. If nothing in
the history, operations, and objectives of the self-incrimination privilege
prohibits applying it to police interrogation, then the need for it should weigh
even more heavily. Professor McNaughton was right in characterizing the
arguments against applying the privilege as a "quibble." It is a pity that he did
not stand by this conviction when he revised Wigmore's discussion of the
privilege.
Edwards, Chief Justice Burger concurred on the specific ground that the jailer's statement
made the suspect's purported waiver involuntary. Id. at 488.
783 On every one of the few occasions when I have been stopped for an alleged traffic
offense, the officer acted peremptorily. On every one of those occasions, it never occurred
to me, under the stress of the moment, that I did not have to answer the officer's questions.
Other lawyers have confirmed my experience with their own.
784 See supra note 760 and accompanying text regarding the operation of the
constitutional privilege. As long as the risk of prosecution is substantial enough to escape
being called frivolous, the privilege may be asserted in these proceedings. See BERGEP,
supra note 85, at 87-88.
785 See supra note 765 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has been driven by two questions. The first is whether, as
Wigmore insisted in his treatise and Chief Justice Rehnquist implied in
Connelly, the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and the
involuntary confession rule are distinct. In dealing with this question, I have
separately considered the common law and constitutional protections. After
examining the histories, operations, and objectives of the common law
protections, I have concluded that the common law privilege and the common
law confession rule are remarkably alike, supported by the same complex of
values, including reliability. In only two situations, both of which fall outside
the privilege, is there clearly a need for a separate rule barring the admissibility
of involuntary confessions. In any case that falls within the boundaries of the
privilege, however, no unique purpose is served by the confession rule and it is
really nothing more than the exclusionary rule of the privilege. Insofar as the
constitutional protections are concerned, the same conclusion emerges with
even greater force, for, largely as a result of Connelly, the Fifth Amendment
privilege and the due process confession rule are even more alike than their
common law counterparts. Consequently, in most instances we should prefer
the privilege over the due process rule in determining whether a confession is
admissible.
In Connelly, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion implied a
preference for using the due process rule to determine the admissibility of
confessions in cases of police interrogation that are outside Miranda. Before
Malloy v. Hogan, the Court had to use the due process rule because the Fifth
Amendment privilege was not applicable to state proceedings. Had it not done
so, it would have been unable to impose constitutional restraints on even the
most abusive interrogation. For the past twenty-seven years, however, the
privilege has been applicable. It deals explicitly with compulsory incrimination;
the Due Process Clause does not. Given the striking similarity of the
constitutional protections and the fact that the due process rule serves virtually
no independent purpose, the Court's preference for a due process approach is
doctrinally baseless and should be abandoned in favor of an analysis which
relies explicitly on the privilege.
The second question with which I have been concerned is whether, as
Wigmore implied and McNaughton insisted, the privilege is inapplicable to
police interrogation. This question is related to the first: if the privilege is
inapplicable, then the Court must use a due process approach (however flawed
it may be) or abandon all regulation in state cases. The Wigmore/McNaughton
position rests on an assumption that all privileges are inherently linked to
proceedings in which a questioner has the authority to impose or seek the
sanction of contempt for refusal to answer. The assumption is groundless. It is
contrary to the policies underlying evidentiary privileges in general and the
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cases interpreting and applying privileges. Nor does it find support in the
history, operations, and objectives of the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination, or in more general policy considerations. Indeed, to the extent
that these matters speak at all, they speak in favor of applying the privilege to
police interrogation.
The conclusions of this Article will be no panacea. Even if courts abandon
due process analysis and use only the privilege to determine the admissibility of
confessions obtained by governmental action, they will still have to decide
whether the defendant's confession was "compelled" in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. Like "involuntary," "compelled" is not clear, and its ambiguity
will leave room for maneuver. It will, however, leave considerably less room
than an involuntariness approach. Some will oppose this restriction on police
interrogation. In his Miranda dissent, Justice Harlan observed that, under the
due process approach, "in practice and from time to time in principle, the
Court has given ample recognition to society's interest in suspect questioning as
an instrument of law enforcement. Cases countenancing quite significant
pressures can be cited without difficulty, and the lower courts may often have
been yet more tolerant." 786 Justice Harlan did not rue this development.
Rather, he decried the majority's use of the privilege in place of the due
process analysis.
Certainly the privilege does represent a protective concern for the accused and
an emphasis upon accusatorial rather than inquisitorial values in law
enforcement .... Accusatorial values, however, have openly been absorbed
into the due process standard governing confessions.... Since extension of
the general principle has already occurred, to insist that the privilege applies as
such serves only to carry over inapposite historical details and engaging
rhetoric and to obscure the policy choices to be made in regulating
confessions. 787
It is not clear which historical details Justice Harlan had in mind or why he
regarded them as inapposite to police interrogation. It is clear, however, that a
preference for the due process voluntariness test is a preference for a judicial
construct the history of which obscures underlying values. It is also clear that
obscuring underlying values facilitates "policy choices" that countenance "quite
significant pressures" in the service of law enforcement, but in derogation of
individual dignity, autonomy, and privacy. "There have been powerful
hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the Court to
water down constitutional guarantees and give the police the upper hand." 788
786 Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 509 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
787 Id. at 511.
788 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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The genius of the privilege is precisely that it is not a judicial construct, that it
has a vivid history, and that it illuminates underlying values. Using the
privilege will not remove the necessity for making policy choices. It will,
however, force judges to take their thumbs off the scale and to give fair weight
to dignity, autonomy, and privacy. When judges strike this delicate balance, is
it too much to ask that the shade of John Lilburne be in the courtroom?

